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 The “whaleback” type of bulk commodity freighter, indigenous to the Great Lakes of 
North America at the end of the nineteenth century, has engendered much notice for its novel 
appearance; however, this appearance masks the essential vernacularity of the vessel.  
Comparative disposition analysis reveals that whalebacks experienced longevity comparable to 
contemporary Great Lakes freighter of similar construction material and size, implying that 
popular narrative overstates whaleback abnormality.  Market and social forces which 
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CHAPTER 1: GREAT LAKES WHALES AND WHERE TO FIND THEM 
“A thing is a thing, not what is said of that thing.”  
Attributed to Susan Sontag 
Introduction 
Out of all the vessels in history, few have been more unjustly burdened with moral and 
intellectual baggage than the whaleback.  Whalebacks of the Great Lakes bulk commodities trade 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not as remarkable as has come to be 
believed.  They were not especially safe, nor were they fearfully dangerous.  They were not 
golden geese, nor white elephants.  As feats of engineering, they were neither tremendous 
prodigies nor vast follies, and yet all of these have been asserted, believed and repeated.  
Whalebacks were unusual in appearance, certainly, but on the balance they were not atypical 
craft for their time and place. 
 Certainly the whaleback has no greater symbolic meaning, although attempts have been 
made to invest them with it (Bowen 1946:181-182; Wilterding 1969:2; Frew 2008:169). The 
narrative they are best equipped to carry is perhaps that in tumultuous times fortunes could rise 
and fall quickly. The weight of general opinion, insofar as opinion about them was ever general, 
has swayed between two poles: the first that, as Bowen opines, they were “truly a symbol of 
Great Lakes ingenuity” (Bowen 1946:182); the second that they were self evident dead ends in 
the development of shipbulding. Thus when the (British) Institution of Naval Architects 
considered the whaleback design, the society’s vice president, Mr. B. Martell declared a 
whaleback “a vessel, no one can doubt for a moment, entirely unfit for ocean-carrying 
purposes…” only to be interrupted by a second member, Mr. John Corry, interjecting “any 
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purpose” (Goodall 1892:199).  This bi-polar image is very much off the mark, but it has made 
for good stories.  The real story, though, is interesting too. 
 The conventional narrative of whalebacks is that they were economic failures (Daley 
2000:8-12); however, it is possible to argue that based on the performance of the vessels 
themselves, and based on the survival of elements of their design, that the ships acquitted 
themselves reasonably well.  This standard narrative of whalebacks, found mainly in non-
academic popular history, is actually a flattening and conflation of three separate narratives: that 
of the technical aspects of the vessels themselves; that of the company which built them, the 
American Steel Barge Company; and that of their inventor, Captain Alexander McDougall.  
These stories tend to resolve into two types.  Earlier Gilded-Age accounts emphasize elements of 
innovation and progress, reinforcing America’s contemporary self-image.  In this vein are the 
Los Angeles Times article, which trumpets the whaleback Christopher Columbus as “probably 
the most noteworthy vessel, as to model, ever built” (Los Angeles Times 1892:6), and the 
Washington Post account, which states, “In the opinion of many experts the success of the 
[whaleback] Wetmore foreshadows a revolution in shipbuilding” (The Washington Post 1891:4).  
Later accounts tend to focus on the perceived “serious defects” of the design, as Wright describes 
it (Wright 1969:52).   In either case, a form of ruling theory may be at work.  Sometimes the aim, 
stated or otherwise, is not a strict adherence to the best available facts, but rather to “retell” 
“wondrous tales” (Bowen 1946). 
The following pages will attempt to disentangle these three separate narratives, while 
examining the processes through which they were shaped.  Insofar as possible, McDougall’s 
whalebacks will be considered independently of the fortunes of their inventor and the company 
which he founded to build them.  These vessels will be placed into a larger context in the 
3 
 
evolution of shipbuilding and the development of steel as a shipbuilding material.  Newly 
introduced statistical comparison of whalebacks with contemporary vessels will argue against the 
idea that the whaleback design can be considered a failure.  The centerpiece of the argument 
presented is disposition research comparing the relative longevity of whalebacks and comparable 
contemporaneous Great Lakes vessels, finding whalebacks to not be statistically shorter lived 
than their competitors.  The interplay of competing narratives has masked the essentially 
vernacular nature of these vessels. 
What is a whaleback?  In the very simplest terms it is a sort of rounded-off bulk freighter, 
conceived and built by its inventor, Alexander McDougall, on North America’s Great Lakes, at 
the end of the nineteenth century (McDougall 1932:32-33).  As can readily be seen in Figure 1.1, 
which illustrates A. D. Thompson, a typical whaleback, the vessels are cigar-shaped, built to rest 
low in the water when loaded, and bear a passing resemblance to a submarine operating in 
surface mode.  A more thorough technical description will follow in this chapter.  As 
McDougall’s whalebacks were only built for a period of nine years, there has been an inordinate 
amount of focus on why they failed; however, discussions of failure need to be informed by the 
nuance of time and place (Daley 2000:9).  By placing whalebacks in the context of relevant 
vessel types, it will be possible to make a more balanced appraisal of their success or failure.  It 
will also be shown, in Chapter 2, that the unique economic situation of America in the late 
nineteenth century, particularly on the upper Great Lakes, was a critical factor in both the rise 
and demise of the whaleback type.  Exploring the lineage of these vessels, both predecessors and 
antecedents, and considering how whalebacks interacted with competing models, opens up larger 
themes in the industrial, economic, and intellectual history of turn of the century America, and is 
ultimately a story of how cultural and market forces sometimes eddy and flow around powerful 
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individuals.  It is also an opportunity to examine how the conventions of storytelling impose 
themselves onto history.  Every story needs a protagonist, a series of causally related incidents, 
and some sort of resolution or moral, and there is a tendency to supply these elements even when 
they do not strictly fit the facts (Bal 1997:3-15). 
 
FIGURE 1.1.  “Whaleback Freighter Locking through Canal, Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.”  Identified 
on reverse as Steamer A.D. Thompson, this whaleback shows the standard hull-form and layout 
of a whaleback propeller.  (Postcard, V. O. Hammon Publishing Company, circa 1900.) 
General Description of Vessel Type 
Native to the Great Lakes, and built there almost exclusively, the whaleback design nonetheless 
had an influence on ship design on a world scale.  It was a bold experiment in the possibilities of 
a new shipbuilding medium, namely steel.  The whaleback type is rarely given much credit for 
influencing future designs; nonetheless it can be seen as having a clear place in two shipbuilding 
traditions.  It is a slight outlier in the general development of Great Lakes bulk freighters 
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(Devendorf 1995:24), and is difficult to understand if not kept in the strict context of its own 
time and place.  It also fits broadly into the larger tradition of experimentation in hull design, a 
process greatly abetted by the development of iron and steel as shipbuilding media (Guthrie 
1970:v-vi).   
 The general whaleback type included several classes of self-powered ships and 
unpowered barges of various sizes, as well as one passenger ship.  All were designed by 
Alexander McDougall, and all were constructed between 1888 and 1897 (Wilterding 1969:15-
68; Table 1.1; Table 1.2).  All but one were built by McDougall’s American Steel Barge 
Company (Wilterding 1969:67).  Various other vessels and vessel classes share some degree of 
kinship with the whaleback and shall be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.   
A scholar of the subject, C. Roger Pellet, provides a list of six defining whaleback 
characteristics and ancillary features, which is concise and definitive enough to deserve 
reproducing at length: 
 A spoon-shaped bow.  The first whaleback ship (Barge 101) had a conical-
shaped bow intended to reduce the tendency of a barge to yaw when 
towed.  The conical shape was refined to a spoon shape on later barges 
and McDougall chose to retain it when he began to build powered vessels. 
 Low freeboard.  To minimize weight, McDougall eliminated the forecastle 
deck usually found on ships, and designed his whaleback with a straight 
sheer.  (The deck line did not rise as it approached the ship’s bow and 
stern.) 
 Arch-shaped decks.  The arch shape allowed the deck to shed water and 
permitted a lighter structure, further reducing hull weight and construction 
cost. 
 Narrow stern.  Unlike conventional Great Lakes ships built with wide, fan-
shaped sterns, whalebacks were built with narrow sterns that reduced the 
tendency of the stern to lift to a passing wave. 
 High-integrity hatches.  Since there was no forecastle or forward deck 
sheer to protect them, conventional hatches with wooden covers would not 
have provided sufficient watertight integrity.  Instead, all whalebacks were 
built with steel-plate hatches secured with bolts and sealed with gaskets. 
 Turrets.  To provide entry below deck, openings for whalebacks were 
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placed in turrets erected on top of the hull . . . .  The bow turret also 
provided a protected space to house the anchor windlass, and the stern 
turrets provided an elevated foundation for the pilot house, the galley, and 
crew quarters. 
 Other features: Whalebacks also included several features aside from the 
hull that were invented and patented by McDougall.  Included were 
special anchors, watertight skylights, and towing and anchor handling 
fairleads (Pellet 2008:4). 
 
The major features are visible in Figure 1.2, lines drawings of Colgate Hoyt from Bowling Green 
University’s Historical Collection of the Great Lakes.  These are the basic parameters, but it will 
serve no purpose to observe too high a degree of orthodoxy.  Thus, a whaleback retrofitted with 
low-integrity hatches is still a whaleback for our purposes, albeit a less capable one.  An altered 
design, such as a whaleback with a conventional bow, or a flat cargo deck, will still, even with its 
watered-down pedigree, have some place in this discussion.  For example, the last whaleback 
built, Alexander McDougall sported a conventional bow and a forward bridge, but exhibits the 
other diagnostic features of the type, as can be seen in Figure 1.3. 
 
FIGURE 1.2.  Plans of the whaleback steamer Colgate Hoyt (Amship Predecessors 1888-





FIGURE 1.3.  Alexander McDougall, the last whaleback built, was the only whaleback 
constructed with a conventional bow (Postcard, W.C Milner and Company, postmarked 1907). 
 
 Tables 1.1 and 1.2 list every whaleback built, with select particulars.  Table 1.1 lists 
propellers, that is, self-propelled steam vessels.  Table 1.2 lists unpowered barges.  Three of the 
ships included on Table 1.1 are especially unusual.  The propeller Sagamore, not to be confused 
with the eponymous barge, was an unauthorized copy of McDougall’s design and never saw 
service in the Great Lakes (Wilterding 1969:67).  City of Everett was assembled from 
prefabricated pieces on the Pacific Coast; it too never saw service on the lakes (Wilterding 
1969:63).  Christopher Columbus was purpose built as a passenger vessel and had a long and 
successful career, most notably at the Chicago World’s Fair (McDougall 1932:35-37; Wilterding 
1969:43.45).  Illustrated in Figure 1.4, Christopher Columbus will have little place in the 
following discussion.  All of the barges were built for use as consorts, that is, they were meant to 
be towed by powered vessels of a similar size, a common arrangement at the time on the Great 
Lakes (Thompson 1991:49).  Many of these barges ended their careers on the Atlantic (Table 
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1.2).  Although the locations of several whaleback wrecks are known (Frew 2008:161-164), the 
only surviving example above water is in Superior, Wisconsin, the museum ship Meteor, built as 
Frank Rockefeller (Zoss 2007:127). 
 
FIGURE 1.4.  The whaleback passenger steamer Christopher Columbus (Postcard, A. C. 







LENGTH LAUNCHED END COMMENTS 
 
Colgate Hoyt 1253 276 1890 1909 Off Lakes 1906.  Wrecked 1909, NJ. 
Joseph L. 
Colby 
1245 265 1890 1935 Periodically off Lakes. Scrapped 
1935. 




1400 265 1891 1936 Off Lakes 1905-1922.  Scrapped 
1936. 
Pathfinder 2425 340 1892 1933 Sold for scrap 1933. 
James B. 
Colgate 
1713 308 1892 1916 Sank, Lake Erie. 
Samuel Mather 1713 308 1892 1924 Sank, Lake Huron. 
John B. Trevor 1713 362 1895 1935 Off Lakes 1918.  Scrapped 1935. 
John Ericson 3201 390 1896 1966 Out of service 1966, scrapped 1967. 
Frank 
Rockefeller 
2760 366 1896 1972 Out of service 1972; museum. 
Alexander 
McDougall 
3686 413 1898 1947 Scrapped 1947. 
Charles W. 
Wetmore 
1399 265 1891 1892 Off Lakes 1891, wrecked 1892, 
Coos Bay, OR. 
Thomas Wilson 1713 308 1892 1902 Collision, sank. 
Washburn 2234 320 1892 1936 Scrapped, 1936. 
Pillsbury 2234 320 1892 1934 Wrecked. 
Sagamore 2140 297 1893 1917 Built in UK; Torpedoed; never 
entered Great Lakes 
City of Everett 2504 346 1894 1923 Built Everett, WA; sank 1923.  
Never entered Great Lakes. 
Christopher 
Columbus 
1511 362 1893 1936 Passenger vessel.  Scrapped 1936. 
TABLE 1.1.  Selected particulars of whaleback propellers, from the dataset in appendix A, 





NAME TONNAGE LENGTH LAUNCHED END COMMENTS 
 
Barge 101 428 178 1888 1908 Sank, Maine coast. 
Barge 102 1192 253 1889 1905 Foundered Cape Charles, VA. 
Barge 103 1192 253 1889 1909 Foundered, Sandy Hook, NJ. 
Barge 104 1295 276 1890 1908 Foundered, vicinity Cleveland, 
OH. 
Barge 105 1295 276 1890 1910 Foundered, vicinity Fire Island 
Lightship, NY. 
Barge 107 1295 276 1890 1913 Sank Nantucket Shoals, 1913. 
Barge 109 1227 265 1891 1914 Foundered Montauk Point, NY. 
Barge 110 1296 265 1891 1932 Explosion, burned at dock, sank, 
St Rose, LA. 
Barge 111 1227 265 1891 1916 Collision, sank, Hampton Roads, 
VA. 
Barge 115 1169 256 1891 1899 Stranded, Pic Island, Lake 
Superior 
Barge 116 1169 256 1891 1946 Scrapped, TX, 1946. 
Barge 117 1310 285 1891 1926 Sold British 1926, no further 
record. 
Barge 118 1310 285 1891 1946 Scrapped, TX, 1946. 
Barge 122 
(Sagamore) 
1601 308 1892 1901 Collision, sank, Whitefish Bay. 
Barge 126 1128 264 1892 1905 Stranded, Buzzard's Bay, MA. 
Barge 127 1128 264 1892 1936 Scrapped 1936, New Orleans, 
LA 
Barge 129 1310 292 1893 1902 Collision, sank, 1902. 
Barge 130 1310 292 1893 1924 Scrapped, TX, 1924. 
Barge 131 1310 292 1893 1946 Scrapped, TX, 1946. 
Barge 132 1310 292 1893 1927 Foundered, Freeport, TX 
Barge 133 1310 292 1893 1911 Foundered, Fire Island, NY. 
Barge 134 1310 292 1893 1912 Stranded, Hampton Roads, VA. 




2721 377 1896 1965 Scrapped, 1965 
Barge 201 664 182 1890 1919 Stranded, Sandy Hook, NJ. 
Barge 202 665 182 1890 1908 Foundered, Barnegat, NJ. 
TABLE 1.2.  Selected particulars of whaleback barges, from the dataset in appendix A, compiled 
with special attention to Devendorf 1995 and Daley 2000. 
 It is the nature of ships, as tremendously large investments of capital, in any era, to 
change as they age, and to be, if they live long enough, reinvented several times over.  Thus, a 
large ship, built to specific purpose and embodying the latest innovations, will decades later find 
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itself outmoded and relegated to a less demanding and usually less lucrative trade.  Later yet, it 
may be cut down to a barge, or a hulk, not worth repowering, but still of some use.  Finally, the 
vessel might end its days as a wharf extension or scrap yard (Rodgers and Green 2003:30,42; 
Rodgers et al. 2006:1-2,18).  So it is, that in ships at least, obsolescence is a natural part of life.  
A long career that ends in a whimper, rather than with a bang, should not necessarily be taken as 
a failure. 
 To contextualize whalebacks, one must begin with their trade: they were by and large 
bulk freighters (Table 1.1; Table 1.2).  Dry bulk cargo is any sort of high-mass, low value 
granular commodity, the sort of thing which is bought by the ton and delivered in a pile.  
Taconite (unrefined iron ore pellets), grain, coal, and gravel are all prime examples, and all are 
well-represented in the Great Lakes bulk trade (Livingstone 1891:5).  A bulk freighter is 
essentially a large empty space for cargo with a ship built around it.  As form follows function, 
the whaleback naturally shares a great deal in common with the conventional Great Lakes 
freighter.  Both were built as large as available capital and technology would allow, within the 
limits imposed on them by the waterways on which they were obligated to travel, as detailed in 
Chapter 2.  Both had long parallel midsections, with most of their deck space devoted to hatches, 
maximizing access to the un-partitioned hold which comprised most of their interior.   In both, 
the superstructure was confined principally to the extreme ends of the vessel.  Both mounted 
machinery aft, minimizing the run between engine and propeller and maximizing space for cargo 
foreward.  In form, the conventional lake freighter is particularly boxy, nearly square in section 
for most of her length, usually terminating in a plumb, wedge-shaped bow and a conventional 
rounded transom.  Whalebacks in section are slightly rounded squares, terminating in blunted 
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conical bows and sterns (Amships Predecessors 1888-1898; Thompson 1991:30-41; Devendorf 
1995:7-49; Riesenberg 1936:304). 
 The lineage of all lake freighters is generally traced back to a single sire, the wooden-
hulled steamer R. J. Hackett of 1869 (Figure 1.5).  The first ship purpose-built for the Great 
Lakes bulk trade, Hackett was 211 feet in length and 33 feet abeam, essentially at the structural 
limits of wooden hull construction technology (Devendorf 1995:7,53; Thompson 1991:22-23).  
Her features became the archetype for Great Lakes freighter design up to the present day: boxy 
lines, a forward bridge superstructure, engine or engines aft, with additional accommodation 
superstructure above, and a long run of deck hatches between to maximize speed of loading and 
unloading (Devendorf 1995:7-8; Thompson 2000:18; Reisenberg 1936:304).  The forward bridge 
was handy in navigating tight inland waterways and cargo docks.  The proliferation of hatches 
reflected the short routes on the Lakes.  Lakers spent a much greater portion of their lives at 
loading and unloading docks, compared to ocean steamers, and so the ability to load and unload 




FIGURE 1.5.  R.J. Hackett, generally acknowledged as the first example of a conventional lake 
freighter (Historical Collections of The Great Lakes, Bowling Green University.  Accessed 
online: http://greatlakes.bgsu.edu/vessel/view/000015). 
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, sail was the primary driver of waterborne 
trade.  The launch of Hackett in 1869 (Devendorf 1995:8) was a signal of the eventual eclipse of 
sail by steam, although sail in the bulk trade persisted through the turn of the century, typically 
as auxiliary power for barges designed to be towed by a steamer.  At the time Hackett was built, 
available engines were capable of moving more tonnage than available hull technology could 
carry, leading to a system of steamers towing dedicated consort barges, a model which did not 
fade out until the early twentieth century (Thompson 1991:48-49). 
 Figure 1.6 represents a cross-section of Great Lakes trade at the turn of the century.  
From left to right, foreground, are a whaleback steamer, a conventional steamer, and probably a 
sailing schooner barge.  The whaleback is apparently empty, or nearly so, as it is showing the 
characteristic high bow for which whalebacks were noted when running light.  The conventional 
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steamer has the typical forward bridge/machinery aft layout.  The third vessel is presumptively 
an unpowered barge, based on the relative lack of superstructure aside from the three fore-and-
aft rigged masts (Devendorf 1995:7-10, 18-29).    
 
FIGURE 1.6.  “Elevators and Shipping, Buffalo, NY (Postcard, Detroit Publishing Company, 
1900).”   
 
 A ready availability of ship-building timber, among other factors, retarded the adoption 
of ferrous hulls in the Great Lakes bulk trade until the launch of the iron-hulled Brunswick in 
1881 (Hoyt 2008:4).  Onoko, built in 1882, is also commonly cited as the first ferrous bulk 
freighter on the lakes (Wright 1969:5).  Regardless of which vessel is officially credited as first, 
they were vanguards of a wholesale change in vessel construction on the lakes.  The last two 
decades of the nineteenth century marked a period of rapid economic transition on the Great 
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CHAPTER 2: TRADE AND CIVILIZATION MOVE WEST 
In the new world lies a cluster of inland seas, matchless in extent, 
about which has been growing for three centuries a new 
civilization, surpassing in splendor and in might the sea-girt 
empires of the past.  Upon these Great Lakes are fleets that excite 
the wonder of the world.  Commerce has here established a new 
domain, developing in recent years, and the future of which no 
man dares to measure by existing standards.  Cities, peopled by a 
progressive and dominant race, have sprung up along the shores of 
these Great Lakes and attained conspicuous eminence and wealth 
(Mansfield 1899[1]:1). 
 
In gauging the success or failure of whalebacks, context will be everything, thus it will be 
necessary to have some understanding of the economic and cultural landscape of the Great Lakes 
region in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Once the stage is set, the players will be 
introduced, and then the play set in motion.  
 It will be helpful to define the Great Lakes region, and mention a few points of interest.  
Although the examples here are generally drawn from the American side of the Lakes, the same 
patterns will broadly be seen to apply to the Canadian side as well.  The term Midwest will be 
eschewed, as there is no end of disagreement as to what it actually refers.  Generally, the Great 
Lakes region can be defined as the coastlines of the lakes themselves, as well as their watersheds.  
The Great Lakes have two heads, at Chicago and Duluth, and one natural outlet, the St Lawrence 
River.  The opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 (later part of the New York State Barge Canal) 
created a second artificial outlet, at least as far as commerce is concerned, linking Lake Ontario 
at Oswego with the Atlantic by way of the Hudson (Mansfield 1899[1]:188).  The Great Lakes 
are conventionally divided into the Upper Lakes, Superior, Michigan, Huron; and the Lower 
Lakes, Erie and Ontario, separated by the Detroit/St Clair River System (Figure 2.1).  Before the 
17 
 
construction of artificial locks and canals, Lake Superior was separated from Lake Huron by the 
rapids at Sault Ste. Marie; Lakes Erie and Ontario were separated by the Niagara River and 
Niagara Falls. 
 
 FIGURE 2.1.  General Map of the Great Lakes. (Wikimedia Commons.  Accessed 24 November 
2015  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Great-Lakes.svg). 
 
To the east, the Great Lakes are bordered by the traditionally industrial Northeast and 
Mid-Atlantic regions of the United States.  To the west, they border the ore ranges of Minnesota, 
Wisconsin and Michigan, and the fertile farmland beyond.  Although a considerable variety of 
commodities have been shipped by the Lakes over their recorded history, from the fur trade 
carried on by canoe-borne voyageurs to the occasional massive green-energy-generating 
windmill now seen travelling in sections on the back of a salt water freighter today, a few 
economic factors stand out as dominant in the region in the late nineteenth century. 
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By the 1760s three industries were prominent in the nascent Great Lakes trade: fishing, 
copper mining, and fur trapping (Mansfield 1899[1]:116).  It will be appreciated that the latter 
two commodities share something in common.  Both were high in value relative to their bulk.  
Copper mining remains an active industry in the region, and if fur-felt top hats have gone out of 
vogue, well, that is so much the better for the beavers.  As Mansfield writes,  “The principal 
articles of shipment to Buffalo in 1830 were corn, fish, furs, whisky, lumber and shingles” 
(Mansfield 1899[1]:182).  Thus, some seventy years later, trade has shifted towards bulkier 
commodities, but there is still something of a frontier aspect to Great Lakes trade.  These are 
products of an agrarian economy, a shipping manifest that, with minor alterations, would have 
been as at home in biblical times as it is here in the early nineteenth century.  At any rate, the rise 
of the bulk carrier was predicated on the rise of even bulkier, lower value per ton commodities 
moving in staggering quantities: timber, coal, iron ore, grain, and the like.  Arguing in 1891 for 
deeper navigable channels on the Great Lakes, Livingstone notes that: 
Were [lake shipments for 1890] loaded into railroad trains, the 
length of the grain and flour trains would be 1652 miles; of the 
coal trains, 2302 miles; of the lumber and timber trains, 3360 
miles; of the iron ore trains, 3892 miles; and of the general 
merchandise trains, 3000 miles.  The total length of the trains 
would be 14,206 miles or they would stretch more than half way 
around the globe (Livingstone 1891:5). 
 
  This change in trade was not merely a change in scale; it was part of a process of total 
reorganization of the American economy, a tremendous surge towards industrialization and 
mass-production. 
Probably the most definitive factor in the rise of the Great Lakes region, and expansion of 
the United States as a whole, in the second half of the nineteenth century was steel.  The steel 
industry conjured forth bridges, railroads, plows, barbed wire, skyscrapers and a thousand other 
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things.  Steel both fueled and enabled the nation’s westward expansion and rapid 
industrialization.  The historical center of the American steel industry is Western Pennsylvania.  
The undisputed capital of steel country was Pittsburgh, home of Carnegie’s foundry operations, 
and later of U.S. Steel, and not by accident.  Pittsburgh is strategically placed in such a way as to 
have ready access to the three critical raw materials of steel manufacturing.  Pennsylvania and 
West Virginia produced ample supplies of high quality bituminous coal.  The entire Northeast is 
well-supplied with limestone, used in the steel-making process to remove impurities.  Finally, 
although historically iron ore was mined in the Mid-Atlantic, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, the ranges in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and northern Michigan had become the nation’s 
primary suppliers of iron ore.  It will be readily appreciated that the Great Lakes form a natural 
transportation link between the northern ore fields and the foundries of the Northeast.  Further, 
Pennsylvania was historically the heart of the nation’s rail network, providing high demand for 
steel rails. It should also be evident that in an industry where both the raw materials and the 
finished product are massive and bulky, a location with ready access to supplies and 
transportation routes is highly desirable (Garreau 1982:59-60; Morris 2005:122-124,128-133). 
As Table 2.1 shows, ore shipments from the northern ranges rose steadily and 
convincingly, and much of this tonnage travelled by bulk carrier.  A cursory survey of America’s 
major industrial cities, what is now colloquially known as the Rust Belt, reveals a marked 
concentration on the shores of the Lakes, cities such as Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, and 
Chicago.  By the 1890s, Cleveland had become the greatest shipbuilding center on the continent 
(Mansfield 1899[1]:300).  Detroit was once known as the Paris of the Midwest (Vachon 
2009:35).  And Chicago, America’s “Second City” was the de facto capitol of an inland empire, 
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the center of gravity of the vast watershed bordered by the Rockies to the West and the 
Appalachians to the East, as Mansfield declaims: 
Chicago is the favored child of the Great Lakes . . . . The neighbors of the future 
metropolis were more comely in appearance, more decently garbed, but the 
matchless location of Chicago as the point of greatest distance for lake traffic 
towards the growing West, gave it a power that outweighed all other 
considerations (Mansfield 1899[1]:337). 
 
 
Year Shipments of Iron 
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 TABLE 2.1. Condensed from “Total Annual Shipments of Lake Superior Iron Ores by Ranges” 
from The Iron Ores of Lake Superior (Crowell and Murray 1927:96-97).  
By 1900, only two ports outranked Chicago in volume of tonnage handled, London and 
New York (Mansfield 1899[1]:341).  Of the ports handling the most tonnage in the U.S. in 1897, 
three of the top five were located on the Great Lakes: metro-Chicago, Duluth-Superior, and 
Buffalo, with receipts in excess of 10,000,000 tons each, with only New York and Philadelphia 
in competition (Mansfield 1899[1]:361). 
 It is useful perhaps, to think of the Great Lakes district as a nation to itself, one that rose 
out of America as a whole, having a distinct culture and economy, and which is now, and has 
been for some decades, receding back into the general fabric of the country as different eddies 
drive the flow of wealth and humanity within our nation and America’s steel age recedes into 
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memory, our heroic era of foundry and furnace now ceded to other nations where the first 
harvests of the industrial revolution are just now being reaped. 
 Coal, the second key factor in steel-making, was transported on bulk freighters in 
significant quantities, but tended not to be the key driver in lake trade.  Although steel production 
was a major industry throughout the region, the center of gravity was Pennsylvania, which had 
easy access to coal and limestone.  Thus, iron ore tended to be shipped down the lakes to the 
location of these other two commodities, rather than the other way around.  When coal was 
shipped, it was shipped up-bound, as a return cargo.  In the 1890s, the annual tonnage of coal 
shipped on the Lakes tended to be about a third that of iron ore, although annual figures varied 
somewhat (Mansfield 1899[1]:193). 
 Another key commodity in Great Lakes trade is grain.  The westward expansion, abetted 
by the rise of steel, opened the fertile plain states.   
Agricultural wealth in the west owes its success to the Great Lakes.  
Washington perceived the need of transportation facilities to the 
interior of the country, as it existed more than a century ago, and 
he advocated and encouraged the construction of waterways; but 
for years the energies of the land proved unequal to the task.  
Farming languished beyond the Alleghenies until the completion 
of the Erie Canal.  Then was given an impetus to Western 
emigration which continued until the region of the lakes was 
populated; and when settlements penetrated still farther into the 
interior, railroads were constructed to unite the farms and the Great 
Lakes.  To-day (sic) the western farmer with his teeming acres, 
located some fifteen hundred miles or more inland from the 
seacoast, owes to the cheap lake freights his ability to reach the 
markets of foreign lands (Mansfield 1899[1]:3). 
 
Mansfield writes with a grandeur and self-assurance that modern writers seldom dare, and it is 
left to his modern commentator to rein him in.  He neglects one or two salient points, namely:  a 
westward expansion likely would have happened one way or another, Great Lakes or no, given 
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America’s booming population and hunger for arable land; and the not inconsiderable trade route 
offered by the Mississippi and its tributaries reaching from the heart of the continent to the sea.  
Nonetheless, his point stands, people flowed west along the Lakes, and grain flowed back.  
Although the grain trade was important, it will immediately be recognized that it was an 
essentially seasonal trade.  As the bulk trade developed, grain constituted a minority, albeit a 
substantial one, of the tonnage moving on bulk freighters, with Livingstone reporting an 
estimated 4,846,430 net tons of “flour, grain, seeds and milled products” travelling over the 
Lakes in 1890.  He reports iron ore shipments of nearly double that tonnage for the same year, 
9,133,963 net tons (Livingstone 1891:5).   
 Lumber was a major commodity in Lake trade, but it was in decline by the end of the 
nineteenth century.  As Dr. George G. Tunnell described: 
With the depletion of the forests of white and norway pine 
contiguous to the lakes and near the rivers flowing into the lakes, 
the transportation situation has been radically altered.  As the 
lumbermen have been forced to go farther and farther into the 
interior, the railroads have found it correspondingly easier to 
compete with the lake carriers . . . . As the cost involved in moving 
the logs from the remote districts to the lake shore is often 
sufficient to prevent such movement, the logs are sawed at mills 
located at interior points.  From these interior mills, the lumber 
generally goes to market by rail, for the cost of shipping by the 
combined rail-and-water route with its charges for transshipment is 
greater than that by the all-rail lines (Tunnell 1898:95). 
 
Where in 1885, 695 million board feet of lumber had moved by lake, compared to 149 million by 
rail, in 1895 only 136 million board feet moved by lake and 393 million board feet by rail.  The 
overall pattern was towards a diminishing in both total lumber shipped and in the relative share 
shipped by lake (Tunnel 1898:96).  The carriage of lumber on the Great Lakes was increasingly 
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separate, as loading and unloading technologies became more mechanized and focused on more 
granular materials such as grain and ore. 
Oil also enters into our story.  The original petroleum boom was born in Western 
Pennsylvania, in 1859, at Drake’s Well outside of Titusville, and left its mark in the names of 
spring-up towns like Oil City and Pithole (Morris 200517-18; Chernow 1998:74-86).  Oil was 
never a major lake freight commodity.  For the most part, it was shipped by train or pumped by 
pipeline to eastern ports (Chernow 1998:110,171-172).  It is relevant here, though, as a source of 
wealth.  John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, which monopolized the industry, was originally 
capitoled in Cleveland (Chernow 1998:77-78).  Rockefeller and his vast fortune became 
entangled with McDougall’s whalebacks, and were instrumental in both their rise and their fall 
(Daley 2000:28-31,40,51-58,69; McDougall 1932:32-33,40-42,47-49). 
Inseparable from this tremendous growth in trade was a similarly rapid growth in 
population along the shores of the lakes, as Table 2.2 shows, surging far ahead of even the 
booming growth on the Eastern Seaboard. 
 Thus, in the final two decades of the nineteenth century, the period in which the 
whalebacks were built, some definite observations about trade on the lakes can be made.  Steel 
production was the most substantial driving force in expansion, both as a commodity, and as a 
technological accelerator.  Iron ore was the most important freight on the lakes, although by no 
means the only one.  It would be expected that the demands of the ore trade would shape bulk 
carriers even if they sometimes carried other cargos.  Thus, the bulk carrier became, essentially, 
an iron ore carrier, which was conveniently suited to sometimes carry other cargos.  Also of note 
is, that of the industries outlined above, only the iron-ore interests owned their own ships, the 
balance being operated by independent lines (Mansfield 1899[1]:443).  This probably reflects the 
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fact that steel production would require a greater accumulation of capital than the other industries 
mentioned above, and thus be naturally inclined towards more monolithic, vertically integrated 
structures.  At any rate, it might be expected that the ore trade would be the primary driver of 
bulk carrier development, and further, that in the case of those vessels built or owned by the steel 
industry, command decisions might sometimes overshadow market forces. 
City 1850 1860 % Change 1870 % Change 1880 % Change 
Boston 136,881 177,840 30% 250,526 41% 362,839 45% 
New York 696,115 1,174,799 69% 1,478,103 26% 1,911,698 29% 
Pittsburgh 46,601 49,221 6% 86,076 75% 156,389 82% 
Cleveland 17,034 43,413 155% 92,829 114% 160,416 73% 
Detroit 21,019 45,619 117% 79,577 74% 116,340 46% 
Minneapolis 0 2,564  13,066 410% 46,887 359% 
St. Paul 1,112 10,401 835% 20,030 93% 41,473 107% 
Chicago 29,963 112,172 274% 298,977 167% 503,185 68% 
TABLE 2.2.  Population growth in selected U.S. cities, as compiled from census data. 
The Great Lakes region was a locus for a remarkable accumulation of capital, and must 
have seemed at the time to have had the potential for unlimited growth.  A road trip to Gary, 
Indiana or Detroit, Michigan will satisfy the reader that that rising sun is now to all appearances 
a setting one, but it must have been heady times while it lasted.  It must have seemed on that 
steel frontier that any height was attainable, if only a man had the vision and drive to seek it out. 
Infrastructure 
At first blush, it might appear that railways and waterborne transportation would be in 
direct competition with each other, and to a certain extent this is true, but they also complement 
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each other.  Stated another way, transportation is not necessarily a zero-sum game.  During the 
booming development in the Great Lakes region in the latter half of the nineteenth century, both 
would have abetted the population growth seen in Table 2.2 and the economic growth that went 
with it.  The completion of the Erie Canal in October of 1825 further encouraged expansion, 
providing a direct artery between the Upper Lakes and the industrialized East Coast (Mansfield 
1899[1]:222; Plumb 1911:19), and, as Plumb states, inaugurated “a new era on the Lakes” 
(Plumb 1911:80).  The shift towards the use of steel as the primary bulk freighter shipbuilding 
material on the Lakes during the 1880’s, a technology which had already been pioneered and 
mastered decades earlier in other areas, most notably the British Isles (Bowlus 2010:118-120), 
meant that effectively there were no longer inherent constraints on how big a laker could be 
built.  The constraints were all external, and related to choke points in the Lake infrastructure.  
This is deeply germane to the discussion at hand.  Nearly the entire whaleback experiment was 
conducted during a decade and a half, when the limiting factors of bulk freighter construction 
shifted from the structural constraints imposed by the properties of wood to the external 
constraints of chokepoints in Lake infrastructure.  Fourteen years passed between the 
construction of the first ferrous bulk freighter on the lakes, Brunswick in 1881 (Devendorf 
1995:58), and a critical change in the infrastructure of the Great Lakes, the opening of the new 
900’ Canadian Lock in 1895 and the 800’ (American) Poe Lock in 1896 (Mansfield 
1899[1]:244).  Although, over time, there was a general trend of infrastructure development, 
several watershed moments stand out.   
Sault Saint Marie, the rapids at the head of the St Mary River, through which Lake 
Superior empties into Lake Huron, was the critical chokepoint limiting access to the ore fields 
bordering Lake Superior (Plumb 1911:31-33; Kelton 1888:6).  There are other narrow points, of 
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course, most notably the shallow and muddy Lake St Clair, and the winding Detroit and St Clair 
Rivers, but the Sault, a cascade of white water over hard granite bedrock, presented by far the 
most formidable engineering challenge (Bowlus 2010:62-73).  Even today, the main physical 
limiting factor in the size of Great Lakes bulk carriers is the Sault locks (Thompson 1994:187-
189).  A lock is a section of a canal with doors at either end.  It can be drained or filled at a 
controlled rate.  It functions as an elevator and allows ships to safely bypass rapids or other sharp 
changes in elevation.  Thus, a ship can step up or down between bodies of water of different 
elevations (Kelton 1888:8-13). 
In 1797, the first lock was built at the Sault, colloquially referred to as “the Soo.” It was a 
modest affair, 38’ long and 9’ wide, with a thirty inch draft.   It was sufficient for canoe traffic, 
but not much more, and was destroyed in the War of 1812.  In the ensuing four decades, trade 
and resource exploitation in the Lake Superior district developed slowly.  A few small ships were 
built on the lake, or dragged there overland, but the fact that cargos still had to be off-loaded and 
trans-shipped at the Sault was a tremendous check on both development and the flow of goods 
(Dickinson 1981:xii).   
In 1837, the need to build a new Sault canal became a matter of congressional debate, 
but, largely for political reasons, ground was not broken until 1853.  This, the first large scale 
lock, generally referred to as the Harvey lock, opened to traffic in 1855.  The Harvey lock was 
named after the engineer chiefly responsible for its design, a naming convention which would be 
applied to subsequent locks (Dickinson 1981:xiii-xiv; Kelton 1888:7-8). 
The scale, in human terms, of this project should be born in mind.  The Sault canal was 
dug with mid-nineteenth century technology, which meant picks and shovels, wheel-barrows and 
sweat.  The Sault canal and Harvey lock cost a grand total of $1,812.96 (Dickinson 1981:122), a 
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considerable sum.  By means of comparison, a laborer on the project earned $1.10 per day 
(Dickinson 1981:62), and, in the 1850s, before the wide advent of labor-saving machines, it can 
be safely assumed that most of this expenditure equated, in the end, to labor, whether it be 
shoveled earth or quarried facing stone hauled to the work site by creaking schooners.  Add to 
this equation a minor cholera epidemic at the work site (Dickinson 1981:80), and a fairly grim 
picture emerges.  All of this happened at what is still today a frontier, closer to the pole than the 
equator, where winter stays late and comes early.  It is a testament to the sacrifices our forebears 
made to build a nation, but it is also an illustration of the tremendous market forces which 
aligned on an empty quarter to carve a pathway for the lifeblood of an epoch, steel.  Steel built a 
new world and any sacrifice it demanded was laid at its altar, readily and without equivocation. 
In the ensuing decades, it became evident that more capacity would be needed.  
Subsequent locks were built on the American side of the rapids in 1881, 1896, 1914, 1919, 1943, 
and 1969, as well as a Canadian lock completed in 1895.  Each represented an increase in 
capacity (Bowlus 2010:97-98,112-114,196-197; Dickinson 1981:xiv).  Of interest here are the 
Canadian lock and the first three iterations of the American locks: 1853, 1881, and 1896:  
 The Harvey locks of 1853 measured 350 feet by 70 feet, with a design draft of 11 1/2 
feet, and a 9 foot lift (Kelton 1888:7). 
 The Weitzel lock of 1881, constructed next to the Harvey lock, measured 515 feet by 60 
feet, with a draft of 16 feet, and marked a substantial increase in capacity (Kelton 
1888:8). 
 The first Poe lock (Figure 2.2), completed in 1896, replaced the Harvey lock and 
measured 800 feet by 100 feet, with a draft of 21 feet (Mansfield 1899[1]:244). 
 The Canadian lock, completed in 1895, measured 900 feet by 100 feet with a depth of 20 
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feet (Dickinson 1981:xiv; Mansfield 1899[1]:247). 
 
FIGURE 2.2.  The Poe Lock at Sault Ste. Marie nearing completion, from the Blue Book 
of American Shipping, 1896 (Mulrooney and Barton 1896:193). 
 
Each time the Sault Locks were rebuilt, bulk carriers were built to larger dimensions in 
response.  This was a matter of economy of scale.  Bulk carriers could be built larger, and, as it 
were, carry more bulk.  Any number of more or less fixed expenses in both construction and 
operation would stay constant or near constant.  A bulk carrier that was, for example, twenty five 
percent larger than the preceding generation would simply have more of the least expensive part 
of the ship, the long, empty parallel mid-section.  It would still require roughly the same amount 
of all the more expensive parts: bow and stern sections, engines and propellers, gear and ground 
tackle, captain and crew.  This is a simplification, of course, but a modest one.  Bigger ships 
meant incremental gains in efficiency, and thus in profitability (Bowlus 2010:145; Thompson 
1991:22).   
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Further encouraging the trend towards larger ships, improvements in shipbuilding 
technology made their way to the Great Lakes in the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
making the construction of much larger vessels substantially cheaper and easier.  The most 
notable of these technologies were gantry cranes and the switch from hammered rivets to 
pneumatically driven rivets.  The former allowed much larger elements of hull structure and 
machinery to be manipulated and put in place.  The latter resulted in substantial savings in the 
cost of labor.  Between improvements in infrastructure which could accommodate larger hulls, 
and advances in technology making their way to yards on the Great Lakes, the cost of building 
ships fell 30 to 40 per cent per ton in the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century (Wright 
1969:13-16). 
Thus, we might divide Lakers into generations, based on the infrastructure within which 
they operated.  Each new, improved iteration of the Sault locks, the primary chokepoint in the 
bulk trade would beget a new generation of ships.  Older ships would be comparatively 
disadvantaged.  In the freshwater environment of the Lakes, where a steel hull can last 
indefinitely, and with a rebuild can be lengthened or modernized should the need arise, some 
commercial ships thus have celebrated a century of service, with hull construction, and all 
ancillary systems, power plant, navigation equipment and the like being readily updated.  Thus, 
the most meaningful distinction between bulk carriers, assuming no defect in design or 
construction, becomes size.  With a laker’s large cost of construction, it would not be retired as 
soon as a new generation came into service.  As long as trade remained steady and there were 
plenty of cargos to be had, it could remain profitable to run.   
The considerable cost of constructing a large bulk carrier would have discouraged 
builders from getting too far ahead of themselves in terms of speculative building.  An owner 
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might conceivably time a new larger ship to launch at the same time a new larger lock was ready 
to open, but even that would be risky, and there is no evidence that it was ever practiced.  If the 
opening of the new lock was delayed for any reason, the yard would be left with an idle ship – a 
very large investment making no return. 
Patents 
Another factor worth consideration is the overall intellectual property climate during the 
period in question, especially as concerns patents.  The patents system is relatively modern, 
having originated in the Renaissance (de Camp 1961:15).  American patent law was established 
by the Constitution in Article 1, section 8, which reserves to Congress the power “To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (Hamilton et al. 1787:1:8).  
However, the details as to how this law was to be administered and enforced took some decades 
to iron out.   
 De Camp identifies a heroic age of American invention, dating from 1836 to 1917, an 
“age during which the patent laws were well enough organized, and conditions were favorable 
enough to inventors, so that those with meritorious inventions had a fair chance of success” (De 
Camp 1961:41).  This Age is bracketed by the reorganization of the U.S. Patent Office on the 
one hand, and on the other, America’s entry into the First World War, a watershed moment 
which marked the increasing dominance of invention and the patent process by corporate 
research and development departments, effectively shutting out, in most cases, the independent 
inventor from the access to capital needed to bring his invention to market.  While the 
independent inventor still exists, the bulk of industrial progress is dominated by large 
corporations.  Khan notes that “During [the early twentieth century] formal college education, 
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human capital accumulation, and financial capital mobilization through corporate ties became 
more important” (Khan 2005:12).  As laid out, the American patent and copyright system, in 
contrast to its European counterparts, was designed to promote an egalitarian concept of 
intellectual property (Khan 2005:8).  This has been cited as a key factor in the rapid industrial 
and economic growth in nineteenth century America (Khan 2005:2-5). 
 Thus, another link in the chain of circumstances leading to the development, and for a 
time, success, of McDougall’s whalebacks was the particular intellectual property environment 
during the Gilded Age.  In an earlier period, patents were difficult, if not impossible to legally 
enforce, as in the case of Eli Whitney and his celebrated and serially pirated cotton gin (De 
Camp 1961:29-30).  Without strong intellectual property protections, a radical innovator in a 
capital intensive field like shipbuilding would have had a difficult time securing financial 
backing.  Any backer would effectively be underwriting the risk without any reciprocal 
guarantee of exclusivity of benefit.  In a later age, an inventor with no formal scientific or 
engineering training to speak of, such as McDougall, would have a decidedly difficult time 
rewriting the accepted wisdom of shipbuilding on gut instinct.  Among Alexander McDougall’s 
other accomplishments, we can list being in the right place at the right time. 
Growth and Consolidation 
The nineteenth century witnessed a complete restructuring of the American economy.  
An agrarian backwater reinvented itself as a world leader in industry in the short space of a 
century (Khan 2000:5).  We have focused mainly on the Great Lakes region, but it will be 
worthwhile to comment on certain larger trends and macroeconomic events. 
 The nation’s railroad network is largely a product of the nineteenth century.  The overall 
pattern of railroad expansion was one of growth in advance of demand and operation on low 
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marginal returns on investment.  This provided both a framework and an impetus for growth and 
commerce (Morris 2005:141-150).  It might be expected, at first glance, that railroads and Great 
Lakes freighters would compete with one another directly.  That, however, assumes market 
conditions approximating a zero-sum game, where growth in one transportation sector would 
automatically mean less business for other modes of transport.  A more nuanced appraisal would 
suggest that Lake shipping and rail shipping complimented each other, that each was better 
adapted to certain types of cargo, and that each fed the other by fueling growth generally.   
 Broadly speaking, the antebellum period saw the rise of two industries which had hitherto 
only been of minor importance: oil and steel.  Rockefeller entered the refining business in 1863 
(Chernow 1998:77).  By 1879, his Standard Oil controlled 90-95% of the refining capacity in the 
country (Morris 2005:152), and having rapidly achieved a horizontal monopoly, was continuing 
to integrate vertically.  A similar process was unfolding in the steel industry.  By the 1880s, 
Carnegie Steel, although well short of a monopoly, had attained a strong position of market 
dominance, and was a perpetual threat to its few remaining rivals (Morris 2005:132-133). 
 The oil and steel industries are only the two most conspicuous examples of a process that 
that was unfolding across the American industrial landscape: cut-throat competition, culminating 
in the winner acquiring and consolidating the loser.  The process repeated itself in industries as 
varied as tin-plate to biscuits (Morris 2005:252). 
 This unparalleled experiment in laissez-faire capitalism had any number of wide-ranging 
effects, from the rise of the labor movement, to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and subsequent 
government regulation of business (Morris 2005:194-196,216-219).  Two in particular, however, 
stand out as relevant to this discussion.  First, it put fortunes in the hands of businessmen that 
would confound the avarice of kings.  In the case of John D. Rockefeller, some of this wealth 
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was reinvested (Daley 2000:5-8).  When Mr. Rockefeller took a stance in an industry, it was 
likely to have wide repercussions, as we will see with McDougall and American Steel Barge 
Company in Chapter 4.  Second, the slash and burn path to market domination was the bane of 
bankers, who were left to clean up the financial mess.  Most fully embodied by J.P. Morgan, this 
move to channel capitalism’s more chaotic expressions away from what Morgan called “ruinous 
competition (Morris 2005:xii)” led to the rolling up of the steel industry into U. S Steel, and the 
consequent consolidations in Great Lakes shipping (Morris 2005:254-266; Wright 1969:135-
146). 
The Cyclical Picture 
As has been noted, McDougall had the impeccable good timing to be active during a 
period that was favorable to the independent inventor.  There is at least one other respect in 
which he was fortunate enough to be on the scene at the right time, that of the larger economic 
picture. 
 Although the latter half of the nineteenth century was characterized by overall explosive 
growth, this growth was by no means a steady unwavering line from point A to point B.  There 
were a number of recessions, although it is tempting to revive the Nixonian euphemism “growth 
correction” (Galbraith 1977:102), as it seems apt in at least this one case.  It was as if the 
American economy was pausing for breath in between lurching sprints.  The pattern should be 
familiar to anyone acquainted with any of the modern market “bubbles”: over-exuberance later 
reined in by a loss of confidence and a subsequent collapse of investments and contraction in 
lending.  If anything, in the absence of a central banking authority, the recessions of the Gilded 
Age were more cyclically regular, more systemic, and more severe (Galbraith 1976:35-38). 
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 That being said, the 1880s were relatively placid, and it is probably no coincidence that 
this is the decade in which McDougall and his whalebacks enjoyed their portion of success.  The 
preceding decade, the 1870s had seen strong growth, in the neighborhood of 4.5 to 6 percent 
annually, but steeply falling prices had radical effects across the board, including doubling the 
rate of business bankruptcies per year throughout the decade.  By the 1880s, the economy had 
reached a more comfortable state of equilibrium, which was to persist until the bank panic of 
1893(Morris 2005: 102-109).  This panic, as shall be more thoroughly explored later, was a key 
part of the chain of events which forced McDougall out of the American Steel Barge Company 
and out of the business of building whalebacks. 
Summary 
Innumerable factors combine to create the historical moment, solar eclipses, the price of 
tea in China, and the plans of men.  There can never be a full enumeration of all the factors at 
play, but the ones outlined above are preponderant in the circumstances surrounding the rise and 
fall of the whaleback.  A variety of factors, notable among them the growth of the steel industry, 
had led to greatly expanded trade and an influx of capital into the Great Lakes region.  This made 
it an advantageous time to enter the shipbuilding industry.   
 The nature of patent law in late nineteenth century America and maritime industrial 
practice towards patent holders were favorable to the lone inventor.  Perhaps more so than at any 
other time and place, inventors were able to develop products and bring them to the market and 
reap the financial benefits of doing so.   
 At the same time, improvements in the infrastructure of the Great Lakes and connecting 
waterways, most notably the canal and locks at Sault Ste Marie, effectively reset the ground rules 
for bulk trade.  This happened several times, but the relevant examples are the construction of the 
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new locks at the Sault in 1881 and 1895/96.  Each time the Sault Locks were rebuilt, it 
represented an opportunity for shipbuilding to leap forward. 
 As if this weren’t enough, the conversion of Great Lakes shipyards from using primarily 
wood to primarily steel was another destabilizing element favoring newcomers and innovators.  
Although ferrous Lake freighters ended up resembling wooden Lake freighters in most respects, 
this was not necessarily a given.  A change to a radically different new technology had the 
potential to carry with it the wholesale reinvention of the vessels involved. 
 The final element was the overall cycle of boom and bust which characterized the overall 
economy during the period.  It is tempting to think of the Gilded Age macro-economy as manic-
depressive.  During periods of economic expansion, as in the expansion beginning in 1881, 
money flowed freely, and new undertakings found it easier to acquire capital.  During 
contractions, as in 1896, we would expect the business mood to be more saturnine.  Money 
would gravitate towards safe investments and proven strategies.  Underlying this in 1896 was a 
wave of industrial consolidations which was by that point reaching the bulk freight industry on 
the Lakes.   
 Men and ideas often find their way forward through adversity.  The story ahead will 
focus on McDougall and his partners, and on the whaleback and contemporary bulk carriers.  
This, however, is a large piece of the puzzle:  McDougall launched his first whaleback in 1888 
and that was a good year to be building something new and different in the bulk trade.  
McDougall launched his last whaleback in 1896 (Table 1.1; Table 1.2).  Had he been ready, in 
terms of innovation, capital, and personal connections, whalebacks might have surged ahead on 
the back of the 1895/1896 canal expansions.  However, the stars were not as perfectly aligned as 
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they had been a decade before, and we shall see that McDougall would have needed to play his 





CHAPTER 3: ALEXANDER MCDOUGALL 
 Our readiest source for information on McDougall himself is his autobiography, 
especially for his early life (McDougall 1932).  He composed it in his old age for the benefit of 
his family, and it is charmingly unburdened by self-deprecation and doubt.  His surviving 
correspondence is almost exclusively related to business matters, and while it is useful in tracing 
the fortunes of the American Steel Barge Company (American Steel Barge Company 1885), it is 
less so in sounding out McDougall’s character and motivations.  Contemporary accounts are of 
the glossy “Who’s Who” variety, connect him closely with whalebacks, and tend to be somewhat 
hagiographic.  In Mansfield’s History of the Great Lakes, Captain McDougall is praised for his 
“ability, perseverance, a consummate knowledge of business affairs, untiring energy, and, above 
all, unerring judgment (Mansfield 1899[2]:3).”  Modern authors who have attempted to render 
him in more depth seem to have resorted to somewhat more supposition than the documentary 
record strictly supports (Frew 2008).  Thus in writing about the man, we have the image of 
himself he projected publicly, but little evidence for any other facets of his exist.  
Photographs of McDougall are similarly scarce.  In one extant example he is of 
indeterminate height, with a strong, square-shouldered build.  His narrowed eyes stare directly 






FIGURE 3.1.  Portrait of Alexander McDougall from the Blue Book of American Shipping, 1896 
(Mulrooney and Barton 1896:193). 
 
Early Life 
McDougall was born in 1845 into a poor family on the Scottish Island of Islay.  “All the 
folks on the Island of Islay were poor,” he writes, “because of the oppression dealt to the tenants 
by wealthy landlords, people were leaving Scotland by the thousands in those days” (McDougall 
1932:4).  He seems to have been exceptionally well-regarded by those who worked for him later 
in life (Wright 1969:53), and we might surmise that his early experiences with poverty gave him 
an egalitarian outlook on life which deeply influenced his relations with labor.  Throughout his 
autobiography, he emphasizes the virtues of hard work and frugality (McDougall 1932:5,6,-9,12-
13,17,19,25-27).  In 1854, his family immigrated to Canada in what he describes as “a miserable 
voyage,” on a small sailing ship, settling in the village of Nottawa in the vicinity of 
Collingwood, Ontario, a town on Georgian Bay (McDougall 1932:4-5).  His father found work 
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as a sawyer, but was fatally injured in a mill accident in 1855 (McDougall 1932:5-6).  At the age 
of ten, Alexander, the eldest child, became responsible for helping to provide for his family, 
which he did by fishing and working at odd jobs for local farmers and craftsmen.  His description 
of the times is laconic, but it is apparent that for the McDougalls it was a life of want and worry 
on this isolated frontier and the account evinces the reader’s empathy all the more for his stiff 
upper lip (McDougall 1932:5-7).  At sixteen, Alexander apprenticed with a blacksmith, saying of 
the experience, “the knowledge that I gained about working iron and steel was worth a great deal 
to me in after life among larger works” (McDougall 1932:8).  In July of 1861, he “ran away” and 
shipped as a deckhand on the steamer Edith.  He tried to enlist with the Union Army, but was 
turned away on account of his youth, and finished the season on the Edith (McDougall 1932:8). 
I sailed all that summer from Collingwood to Chicago.  On our last 
trip to Collingwood I brought from Milwaukee to my home, the 
greatest treasure of my life, which helped to make that little family 
in the log shanty most happy.  This treasure was a new cook stove 
with a high oven, a full sack of yellow corn meal, a full sack of 
white corn meal, and a small box of silver coins which I had 
earned blacking passengers’ shoes; also a rifle with which I could 
shoot some of the game which was so plentiful in the winter. 
 Often since then I have made in a single year what seemed 
a fortune to me, but was never so rich in my life as when I took the 
new stove and the meal and the dimes back to my mother.  It was 
the first time since the family left Port Ellen in Scotland that we 
really had all we wanted to eat (McDougall 1932:9). 
 
The Formative Years 
Even for those not terribly interested in the development of the whaleback steamer, 
Alexander McDougall’s autobiography makes for fascinating reading for several reasons.  
McDougall was an excellent raconteur, presents himself as a bold and self-assured risk taker, and  
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is an invaluable observer of the transition from sail to steam and from wood to steel.  His 
narrative voice is clear and unique, and imparts a novelistic quality to his writing. 
“From 1861 to 1880 I followed the Lakes as a deckhand, porter, second mate, mate and 
pilot, and then captain,” McDougall writes (McDougall 1932:9).  When McDougall later 
transitioned to shipbuilding, it was on the practical experience that he gained working on the 
Lakes, based on decades of observation and rumination.  Although he had no formal experience 
in naval architecture, he had a grass roots understanding of the demands of Great Lakes trade, 
and several business ventures under his belt (McDougall 1932:10-31).  
In 1864, McDougall began shipping on vessels working the burgeoning Lake Superior 
trade.  At that time, the region was a sparsely populated frontier, largely without charts and aids 
to navigation.  Development of the region was driven by copper and iron ore mining, a trade that 
at the time was in its infancy, but was experiencing strong growth because of the material 
demands associated with the Civil War.  McDougall worked freight and passenger steamers, in 
what must have been brutally demanding conditions (McDougall 1932:11-13).  At the time, 
twelve hour days were the baseline for maritime trades, and the demands of loading, unloading 
and ship-handling would often infringe on “off-time.”  Piloting on the confined waters of the 
Great Lakes could be more taxing than on the open sea: rocks, shoals, and an unfriendly shore 
were never far enough away to be put out of mind.  The contemporary emphasis on steaming 
ahead at speed despite inclement weather or decreased visibility is well documented (Thompson 
2000:55-56,77,331).  Thus, the Great Lakes watch-keeper must have often found himself 
suspended between the Scylla and Charybdis of overwhelming fatigue on the one hand and dread 
of unseen perils on the other.   
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McDougall rose quickly through the ranks, through the hawse pipe as it were, working 
his way to the quarterdeck without the benefit of formal training.  By 1870, McDougall had risen 
to become a captain in the robust lake trade and witnessed firsthand the transitions from sail to 
steam and wood to steel (McDougall 1932:15).  The following passage from his autobiography is 
illustrative: 
When I began sailing the Lakes nearly all the carrying was done by 
schooners under sail and by many big sidewheel steamers. 
 There was also a fleet of smaller boats that ran from 
Ogdensburg, N.Y., in the freight and passenger service to Chicago.  
These boats ran through the canal to the Lakes.  They were towed 
by horses through the canals and by steam tugs through the rivers 
and in open water they travelled partially under sail.  They sailed 
in fleets and I have seen as high as 200 windbound in one 
anchorage.  Once in a storm I saw forty of them piled upon the 
beach one after another in the northwest angle of Lake Huron 
(McDougall 1932:9). 
  
During the Civil war, demand for raw commodities such as ore and grain were strong, 
with copper prices being especially robust (McDougall 1932:10), although this was rarely mined 
in sufficient quantities to constitute a bulk trade, and was more often shipped in small lots on 
passenger and tramp steamers (Thompson 1991:10).  After the war, trade tapered off, and 
although McDougall was by now regularly shipping as a mate, he was sometimes compelled to 
work odd jobs, such as making flour barrel hoops (McDougall 1932:13).   
In 1868, traffic on Superior revived with the construction of the Lake Superior & 
Mississippi Railway, spearheaded by robber baron Jay Cooke.  The Lake Superior & Mississippi 
was intended to connect Duluth, at the head of Lake Superior, with the nation’s railway network 
in general.  Boom times on Superior persisted until the collapse of Cooke’s Northern Pacific 
Railroad in 1873 (McDougall 1932:13-17). 
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In the winter of 1870-1871, now employed by the Anchor Line, McDougall helped to 
build three of the first iron vessels on the Lakes, the passenger steamers China, India, and Japan.  
McDougall does not specify what his role in the shipyard was, but given his vigorous 
personality, it was doubtless an active one.  Mariners and shipwrights are sometimes at odds in 
these situations.  A prudent mariner always seeks the best vessel he can get in all regards; a 
successful shipyard produces the best vessel it can within the constraints of time and cost.  At 
any rate, when the 325 foot Japan was finally fitted out, in September of 1871, McDougall, aged 
26, shipped as captain.  In the fall of the same year, McDougall built a home at 214 First Avenue 
West, in Duluth.  McDougall continued his association with Anchor Line until 1876, captaining 
Japan during the sailing season, and entertaining himself with odd ventures during the winter, 
many of them concerning commercial fishing.  He had also undertaken an expedition in the fall 
of 1875 at the behest of the Anchor Line’s manager, E.T. Evans to survey the Russian bulk trade, 
with a mind towards the company’s investment in that quarter (McDougall 1932:15-28). 
In 1876, McDougall took command of the new passenger steamer City of Duluth, which 
ran between Chicago and the various Superior ports, and in the running of which he appears to 
have had a relatively free hand.  He felt that this position was stable and lucrative enough that he 
was able to marry, and did so in the summer of 1876 to Emmeline E. Ross of Toronto.  In 1880, 
he took command of Hiawatha, a bulk steamer which typically towed the consort Minnehaha.  
He also began to position himself as a ship’s agent, chartering and insuring grain cargos, and 
organizing stevedoring parties, and becoming active in the Duluth Board of Trade (McDougall 
1932:28-31).   
In retrospect, it is evident that McDougall’s life up to that point was positioning him to 
build whalebacks, especially as he tells it.  His early experiences in blacksmithing had given him 
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a basic understanding of metal-working.  His involvement in the construction of Japan and his 
subsequent command of that and other ferrous vessels put him in at the ground floor of iron and 
steel shipbuilding on the Lakes.  Although not an expert in ship-design, he was at least 
knowledgeable enough to form opinions on what he wanted and communicate them to more 
experienced naval architects and ship constructors.  He was active in, and well positioned to 
observe the changing bulk trade, with his seafaring career corresponding with the genesis of the 
modern Lake freighter, and with the introduction of steel in Great Lakes shipbuilding.  
McDougall’s off-season ventures had given him a taste of venture capitalism, and his years of 
command on the Lakes had accustomed him to trusting his own judgment and abilities.  Finally, 
he had planted his flag in Duluth, the town strategically located to control the bulk iron ore trade, 
as well as a large fraction of the grain trade (McDougall 1932:7-31).   
The Vessels 
In 1888 Alexander McDougall launched his first whaleback barge, 101.  His wife is, 
apocryphally, said to have exclaimed, “There goes our last dollar,” as it slid down the ways, as 
the investment was entirely McDougall’s own. Barge 101 is almost never mentioned without this 
incident being related as well (Zoss 2007:7; McDougall 1932:32; Frew 2008:34).  It had been a 
launching many years in the making.  McDougall recounts: 
While Captain of the Hiawatha, towing the Minnehaha and 
Goshawk through the difficult and dangerous channels of our 
rivers, I thought out a plan to build an iron boat cheaper than 
wooden vessels.  I first made plan and models for a boat with a flat 
bottom, designed to carry the greatest cargo on the least water, 
with rounded top, so that water could not stay on board; with a 
spoon-shaped bow to best follow the line of strain with the least 
use of the rudder and with turrets on deck for passage into the 
interior of the hull. 
 After demonstrating my idea by models, I could not get 
anything from ship owners and from captains except comments 
such as” “She will roll over, having no masts to hold her up”; or 
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“She has no flat deck and bulwarks to keep the waves off”; or 
“You call that damn thing a boat, -- why it looks more like a pig. 
 Then I thought out a plan to make a steamboat of the same 
form and with a skeag (Sic) aft under the rounded top, and with 
cabins and turrets aft.... (McDougall 1932:32). 
 
The development of McDougall’s concept for the whaleback can be traced through his patents 
applications (Zoss 2006:213).  McDougall’s initial patent application, submitted in 1880, shows 
a very basic concept, with a nearly cylindrical cross-section (Zoss 2006:214-216; US Patent 
241813).  As can be seen in Figure 3.2, this early conception is little more than a rudimentary 
tube with a small rudder.  Subsequent patents revised the vessel’s shape to what Zoss neatly 
describes as a “soft rectangle,” among other refinements (Zoss 2006:218, US Patent 393997).  
As can be seen in Figure 3.3, the concept has developed considerably, especially in the 








FIGURE 3.3.  By 1888, McDougall’s concept of the whaleback hull form had become nearly 
rectangular in midships cross-section, although the basic concept of a hull which offered minimal 
resistance to seas remained (US Patent 393,997, 1888). 
 
 While McDougall is not recorded as crediting any predecessors, the whaleback has 
several ancestors, and fits into a general shipbuilding lineage which Guthrie refers to as “cigar 
ships” (Guthrie 1970:21).  While it is impossible to prove that Captain McDougall had any 
knowledge of these predecessor vessels, it is not much of a stretch to suppose that he did, as they 
were well reported in the press, and probably would have been discussed in the shipbuilding 
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community on the Lakes, if for no other reason than their novelty.  They are presented here in 
order to help establish the whalebacks’ place in a continuing shipbuilding tradition.   
Incidentally, the trend towards streamlining wasn’t confined to maritime conveyances, 
and it is possible that McDougall could have taken inspiration elsewhere, for example from 
Calthrop’s streamlined train, patented in 1865 (US Patent 49227; Figure 3.4).  While McDougall 
and many of his chroniclers tend to present whalebacks as a singular phenomenon, they were in 
fact part of a more generalized movement.  Captain McDougall wasn’t the only one to recognize 
the new possibilities that ready access to steel represented. 
 
FIGURE 3.4.  Samuel Calthrop’s patent for a streamlined steam train, patent 1865, shares 




 The first of the whalebacks’ maritime antecedents were the Winans steamships, named 
after their inventors Ross Winans and his son Thomas.  The first in the series, the only one of the 
family of four ships built in the United States, was launched in Baltimore in 1858 (Guthrie 
1970:218).  Its hull was a tapering tube, terminating in two conical points fore and aft, with a 
circumferential drive propeller mounted amidships.  The basic conception of hull form is visible 
in Figure 3.5.  Among the many claimed advantages of the novel craft, Messrs. Winans claimed 
that: 
. . . [T]he form of the vessel, while it makes her stronger than 
usual, is such as to afford the least possible hold for the wind and 
waves; so that the danger of injury from heavy seas and storms is 
small.  For these reasons, it is believed that the vessel will be an 
unusually safe one. 
 The fact that every portion of the hull or outer shell of the 
vessel is arched in all directions, and the entire material is in the 
best possible position and form to resist the various strains that it 
can be subjected to at sea, gives it an important advantage in point 
of strength, safety, and buoyancy over any other sea-going vessel 
(Harper’s Weekly 1858:676-678).   
 
Notably, whether it was a matter of influence, or parallel thinking, McDougall claimed similar 
merits for his whalebacks.  While the Winans’ ships were decades ahead of their time in many 
respects, they were never a commercial success; the ships’ claustrophobic interiors and their 
weather decks which were reportedly almost uninhabitable from the spray thrown by their 




FIGURE 3.5.  Winans’ Steamship (US Patent 651, 1859). 
 A second prominent ancestor of McDougall’s whalebacks was the barge built in 1877 to 
transport Cleopatra’s Needle from Alexandria to London.  The second millennia BCE obelisk 
was presented to the United Kingdom by the ruler of Egypt in commemoration of Nelson’s Nile 
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campaign (Wilson 1878:v-vii).  A tubular pontoon, crimped into a plumb bow and stern at both 
ends, the barge was constructed around the obelisk it was created to transport (Figure 3.6).  The 
92 foot vessel was equipped with a small cabin on deck and a suit of steadying sails, but was 
essentially a purpose-built package for a single delivery.  It had the additional advantage that, 
stripped of its deck fittings and cabin, it could be rolled to its destination on land (Scientific 
American 1877:1089-1091).  Wright specifically speculates about a connection between the 
Cleopatra’s Needle barge and McDougall’s whalebacks: “he may have conceived the idea of a 
cylindrical hull on a visit to England in 1873, where he had an opportunity to examine such a 
hull designed to carry the Egyptian obelisk from Alexandria to London” (Wright 1969:43). 
 A third forebear of McDougall’s whalebacks was H.M.S. Polyphemus (Figure 3.7), a 
unique torpedo and armored ram vessel commissioned by the British Navy and launched in 
1880.  With a hull shape tending towards oval, she apparently had a tendency to be crank in a 
seaway.  Her low profile would have made her a potentially difficult target, and armed rams were 
somewhat in vogue at the time (Guthrie 1970:32-36). 
 These rhapsodies in steel were not confined to cigar ships.  Russian Emperor Alexander 
II commissioned the turtle-shaped Livadia, launched 1890, 153 feet abeam on a 235 foot length.  
Although she was nearly immune to rolling, her flat bottom pounded alarmingly in a heavy sea 
state, eventually causing her hull to crack, and discouraging further experiments in that direction 





FIGURE 3.6.  The Cleopatra’s Needle Barge.  Although a singular vessel, the family 





FIGURE 3.7.  HMS Polyphemus (Brassey 1888:Plate 38). 
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 While the members of the cigar ship family were not necessarily related in the sense of 
one design leading to the next, they were at least causally linked.  Iron and steel, the new media 
of shipbuilding, offered possibilities that wood did not.  Iron and steel were lighter, stronger and 
more versatile than wood.  A wooden ship was effectively limited, both in size and form, by the 
structural properties of timber and by the size, shape, and availability that this timber occurred in 
nature.  Since steel plates and beams were made, not grown, the nineteenth century shipwright 
was essentially freed from millennia of traditional design constraints (Guthrie 1970:v-vi;21;43-
44). 
By the nineteenth century, humanity found that the castles and ramparts which had once 
been his greatest security in strife no longer served.  As von Clausewitz wrote in the early 1800s, 
“the times are past in which the mere enclosure of a place with walls . . . could keep it perfectly 
dry when an inundation of war was sweeping over the whole country” (von Clausewitz 
1943:358).  The ever increasing destructive power of artillery and various other implements of 
mayhem in a mechanized age made high fortresses unsafe.  Those upon the field of battle were 
forced to engrave trenches upon the face of the earth, and burrow deep into bunkers.  War had 
changed and the only safety from the seas of fire and metal was to be found underground 
(Keegan 1976:231-240). 
 McDougall and the other cigar ship builders chose to burrow, when the accepted practice 
in shipbuilding had, for thousands of years, been to build castles upon the ocean, with high 
prows and sterns as bulwarks.  They abandoned the prevailing wisdom of generations, as if 
humanity’s millennia long contest with the sea had changed.  Obviously, the sea had not 
changed.  The ground rules of the struggle had changed, however, and McDougall and the 
others, consciously or unconsciously must have recognized this.  Only in the nineteenth century 
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did the engine arise to challenge and eventually supplant sail as the primary motive power on 
ships, and the repercussions of this critical technological shift have been manifold and slow to 
play out (Baker, Tryckare 1965:9-16).  The crux of the matter is this:  that while all vessels are 
suspended between two sometimes hostile elements and exist at the unfriendly interface between 
the two, they do not do so equally.  The sailing ship favors one parent, the sky.  All ships depend 
on water for buoyancy and traction.  The sailing ship depends on wind for impulsion.  To the 
steamer, the wind is seldom better than an inconvenience, and sometimes a hindrance.  When air 
and water conspire together, they can produce some of the things that are most baneful to 
mariners: fog, snow, rain, spray that turns to ice, and of course waves.  The vast majority of 
waves are formed by friction between water and moving air, that is, the wind drags the sea along 
with it (Van Dorn 1955: 187-190,258).   
 Because a sailing ship derives its power from the wind, and because the wind is stronger 
and less turbulent higher aloft (Harland 1984:58), it behooves the shipwright to build a sailing 
ship’s rig as high as strength of material and the vessel’s stability render sensible.  Because the 
sails and the men who work them must be above deck, even when the vessel is heeling, the deck 
must necessarily be to some degree raised and protected, usually in proportion to the conditions 
of the waters the vessel is built to ply (Harland 1984:45).  The builder of sailing ships builds a 
castle.   
 An engine, conversely, is best kept low, as it is usually one of the densest, heaviest pieces 
of equipment on a ship.  Vessel stability makes it strongly preferable that a ship’s power plants 
be kept as deep in the vessel as possible (Benford 199:26-28).  The main impetus for building a 
castle vanishes, although secondary reasons might remain, and the shipwright is free to 
experiment with burrowing, with hiding the greater part of the vessel from wind and waves.  
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 Another factor is as follows.  Because wind and wave are usually aligned, and because a 
sailing vessel cannot move directly upwind, a sailing vessel almost never has to meet waves head 
on for an extended period of time (Harland 1984:61-65).  A motor vessel, conversely, can steam 
dead upwind, crashing directly into the seas.  Hull designs have been forced to evolve in 
response, and the cigar ship is one approach.  In the case of H.M.S. Polyphemus, the metaphor of 
entrenchment is especially apt, as her rounded hull allowed her to keep most of her essential 
systems below her waterline (Figure 3.7), but in all cases, the leap forward in thinking about a 
vessel’s essential relationship with the sea is the same.  It did not necessarily follow that a ship 
executed in steel would look anything like a wooden one.  McDougall and the other cigar ship 





CHAPTER 4: THE FLEET 
Between 1888 and 1897, a total of 44 whalebacks were launched, all but one of them by 
McDougall’s American Steel Barge Company.  The 44th, the British Sagamore, was an 
unlicensed copy of McDougall’s design.  All but one of McDougall’s whalebacks, the passenger 
vessel Christopher Columbus, were built for the bulk trade.  McDougall’s fleet of bulk freighters 
and barges totaled a staggering 61,020 gross tons as built, and if laid end to end would have 
stretched out for over two miles (Table 1.1; Table 1.2).  How did McDougall go from his wife 
apocryphally exclaiming, “There goes our last dollar!” at the launch of Barge 101 to admiralty of 
this considerable fleet?  The answer is essentially twofold: conditions and capital.  We have 
already seen in Chapter 2 how the Great Lakes at the close of the nineteenth century presented 
ideal conditions for McDougall, especially in terms of the rapidly growing demand for tonnage 
and the destabilizing technological shift from wood to steel shipbuilding.  The other element, 
financial backing soon fell into place: 
Then, in 1889 I made a model for No. 102, which was to be nearly 
twice as large as the first barge.  I showed this model to many ship 
owners who wanted iron ships.  The rates were high at that time, 
but all I could get was sympathy.  So I took my model to Colgate 
Hoyt, New York, an associate of John D. Rockefeller, who had 
much lake ore to move, and I told him of my patents and plans; 
also of my past experience, which he carefully investigated, with 
the result that I agreed to sell to a company all my patents for 
$25,000 and take it in stock in the company  . . . called the 
American Steel Barge Company (McDougall 1932:32-33). 
 
It is noteworthy that McDougall transferred his patents to the newly formed American Steel 
Barge Company in 1889, in exchange for stock.  In effect, this meant that when he eventually 
lost control of the company, he would lose control of his designs as well.  However, for the time 
being, it gave him the capital and support to pursue his design on a large scale (McDougall 




but two of his barges (Table 1.1; Table 1.2).  The high tide of the Great Lakes fleet, at least in 
number of hulls, was reached in 1893, at 3,018 vessels (Thompson 2000:28).  By 1929, the 
number had fallen to 839 (Thompson 2000:185).  McDougall was riding this tide, the narrow 
window at which demand for tonnage was increasing rapidly, but before it began to be 
reconsolidated into larger vessels.   
Daley, with sound evidence, credits McDougall’s staff, especially his chief draftsman, 
Robert Clark, with doing most of the heavy lifting in terms of advancing McDougall’s general 
concept to a workable real-world vessel (Daley 2000:25-32).  Regardless, history has 
remembered whalebacks as primarily McDougall’s. 
 
Boom Times 
 McDougall’s contact with Rockefeller was through two sets of intermediaries.  He 
received financing through an Eastern syndicate, prominently including Colgate Hoyt 
(McDougall 1932:32-33).  He lost it at the hands of Frederick T. Gates (McDougal 1932:47-49).   
 Frederick T. Gates was essentially a professional cynic.  As he was, by profession, a 
Baptist minister, this is not without a measure of irony.  He was employed by Rockefeller as a 
financial guard-dog.  His initial purview was Rockefeller’s extensive charitable giving.  
Rockefeller was beset with a continuous flood of requests for gifts, most of which lacked merit.  
He retained Gates to sort the wheat from the chaff, and to impose order and regularity over his 
charitable activities.  Gates’ responsibilities were eventually extended to include Rockefeller’s 
investments also.  Upon investigation, many of these investments turned out to be of rather 




 John D. Rockefeller did not become fabulously wealthy by accident, but the acquisition 
of wealth was not his primary motivator.  He seems to have been driven, in his consolidation of 
the petroleum industry under the Standard Oil banner, by an almost religious need to maximize 
efficiency and the justifiable belief that he was the one to do it, what Chernow describes as an 
“overmastering need for order” (Chernow 1998:80).  Money was, perhaps, his way of keeping 
score, but Rockefeller, over his career made more than he knew what to do with. 
Going into the iron-ore fields was one of those experiences in 
which one finds oneself rather against the will, for it was not a 
deliberate plan of mine to extend my cares and responsibilities.  
My connection with the iron ores came about through some 
unfortunate investments in the Northwest country (Rockefeller 
1933:115). 
   
 Gates’ investigation of the West Superior Iron and Steel Company and the associated 
West Superior Land Company, located in Wisconsin proved to be something of a turning point 
The following rather long passage from Gates’ autobiography is worth repeating, as it sums up 
the situation rather neatly: 
[Rockefeller] had made . . . very numerous and very large 
investments, some fifteen or twenty in all, East and West, and even 
some outside the United States.  The aggregate of these 
investments was several millions.  The fact is Mr. Rockefeller had 
been completely absorbed in the interesting development of the 
Standard Oil Trust.  That had been highly speculative.  It had 
proved an Aladdin’s lamp.  He had found no other time to 
investigate other things.  When a group of friends . . . composed of 
old friends, church friends, good Baptist friends, came to him with 
tales of rapid and prodigious fortune in highly speculative new 
enterprises into which they were putting their own money freely, 
and offered him a share on the “ground floor” he was always ready 
to go in with them in those days without much inquiry. . . .  This 
West Superior investment made at the behest of these friends, and 
now shown to be reckless was his first great shock. . . .  He had 




they not have been equally deceived in many of the other 
investments he had made with them (Gates 1977:169)? 
 
 In the aftermath of the panic of 1893, and in the midst of a personal dispute between Hoyt 
and Gates, McDougall effectively lost control of, and his stake in, the American Steel Barge 
Company.  He might have fared better had he abandoned his backing of Hoyt, but he was 
apparently not one to go back on personal loyalty (McDougall 1932:48).  A few more 
whalebacks trickled out of the yard in Superior over the next three years, but the era of 
whaleback construction was effectively over (Wright 1969:49-50).  Relying on primary sources, 
Daley squarely lays responsibility for the whalebacks’ demise at McDougall’s own feet, citing a 
failure to innovate and McDougall’s loss of interest in his design when he lost control of the 
American Steel Barge Company (Daley 2000:72-75).  McDougall’s success was always 
predicated on a certain amount of bluster and force of personality, and in Gates he apparently 
met his match. 
 McDougall’s loss of his company to the direct control of the Rockefeller interests was 
just a small part of an overall pattern of consolidation, both on the Great Lakes, and nationwide, 
in the aftermath of the panic of 1893 (Morris 2005:251-155).  In 1899, the American Steel Barge 
Company was one of seven Great Lakes Shipyards consolidated into the newly formed American 
Shipbuilding Company, which by 1900 would control virtually every shipyard on the lakes.  
With the twentieth century dawning, Great Lakes shipbuilding was in the hands of a monopoly.  
Bulk freighter design would be standardized; deviations like whalebacks would no longer be 
seen (Wright 1969:138-143).   
 In a way, the middle of the story outlasts the end.  While the history of the American 
Steel Barge Company was almost incandescently brief, the vessels themselves persisted.  




1.2; Figure 5.2; Figure 5.6).  This meant that they were a regular feature on the Great Lakes into 
the 1930s, with the longest serving, Frank Rockefeller, active until 1972.  While all but 
Christopher Columbus were built as bulk carriers, many eventually transitioned into other 
careers.  Rockefeller spent time as a sand-dredge and a car carrier before being converted to a 
petroleum carrier for the last three decades of her life (Lydecker 1973:28-29).  Transition from 
trade to trade was common for the longer-lived whalebacks.  Essentially, the economic question 
of whether a vessel type is worth constructing more of is completely different than the question 
of whether an already built vessel was too good to scrap (Wilterding 1969:22,28,39,54,57,60).   
A Fleet of Orphans 
 Once released into the wild, McDougall’s vessels went about their quotidian lives, 
independent of the fortunes of McDougall or his company.  Many met their end by 
misadventure, although not in numbers out of keeping with their contemporaries.  None were 
scrapped before serving three decades.  They remained a normal, if somewhat out of the 
ordinary, part of trade on the Lakes for many years.  In the final chapter, disposition analysis will 
show that whalebacks were not statistically shorter lived than comparable contemporary vessels 
(Figures 5.1-5.8). 
 McDougall, for his part, seems to have simply moved on.  He enters the record mostly in 
connection with whalebacks, although his own autobiography makes clear he remained active in 
his later days (McDougall 1932:50-67).  However if there is little written about his sunset years, 
there is also little indication of acrimony on his part.  Perhaps he was too much of a practical 
man to dwell overly on the past, and he remained able to sustain a comfortable lifestyle (Clark 
1998:5).  He passed away in 1923 at the age of 78, and is well remembered in Duluth as one of 




Although the period of whaleback production on the Great Lakes was relatively brief, the 
design can be seen to have survived in various forms.  On the lakes, whalebacks inspired two 
variant types, “turtlebacks,” which sported rounded foredecks, and “monitors,” or “semi-
whalebacks,” which had conventional bows, but many of the other features of McDougall’s 
vessels.  Both of these types were only built during the early 1890s (Wright 1969:7).  A lawsuit 
by McDougall against the builder of these monitors, the Cleveland Shipbuilding Company, did 
nothing to encourage their development (Daley 2000:39). 
The Turret Ship was a clear whaleback descendant.  Between 1891 and 1911, 182 of 
these vessels were produced, mostly by the shipbuilding firm of William Doxford and Sons 
Limited, of Sunderland, England.  The Turret design, which refined the basic whaleback concept 
by adding a raised centerline trunk, had the advantage of being self-trimming.  As can be seen in 
Figure 4.1, this centerline trunk was essentially an evolution of a whaleback’s turrets into a 
continuous structure.  Although the primary goal of the design was seaworthiness, it had the 
added benefit of paying relatively low Suez Canal tolls, which were calculated based on deck 






FIGURE 4.1.  Midships cross-section, Doxford Turret Ship.   The rounded deck edges of the 
whaleback type are augmented with a raised centerline trunk (U.S. Patent #896,900, 1907). 
 
A modern vessel which is a clear off-shoot of the cigar-ship family is the dracone.  These 
flexible barges are designed for transporting fluids.  Interestingly enough, dracones represent 
conceptual leap in shipbuilding material one remove further than the transition from wood to 
steel which made whaleback possible.  As stated in the patent claim for dracones, “barges are at 




openings above the water line.  This is unnecessary if the barge is only to contain liquids” (US 
Patent # 2997973).  Figure 4.2 illustrates how, conceptually at least, a dracone is the descendant 
of the Winans’ steamships, the whalebacks, and other cigar ships, tubular and eschewing 
freeboard. 
 





CHAPTER 5: RECKONING 
A recurring theme in the literature relating to whalebacks is the question as to why they 
failed (Daley 2000:7-10).  It is possible though, to posit, that the vessels did not in fact fail at all.  
Certainly, they stopped being built, representing a failure of McDougall’s American Steel barge 
Company.  The rise and fall of ASBC, though, as the company which McDougall built, as 
distinct from the Rockefeller run successor which was not much later subsumed by the American 
Shipbuilding Company, can be explained adequately by the interactions of market forces, 
infrastructure developments, and personalities outlined above.  If we separate the company 
which built whalebacks from the basic premise, and further, from the ships themselves, as 
constructed and operated, it can be argued that the design acquitted itself more than adequately.  
 Certainly the whaleback failed to displace the conventional Great Lakes freighter as the 
dominant type, although in the previous chapter we have seen the basic design ideas which 
typified whalebacks have continued in other vessel types.  As an idea, it must be conceded that 
the whaleback concept, if never wholly embraced, has also never been wholly discredited either.   
In order to compare whaleback freighters with their contemporaries, the data set 
presented in Appendix A was compiled.  The data set is composed of 384 ships and 26 
whaleback barges, for a grand total of 410 vessels.  All of these vessels were built between 1867 
and 1900, the transitional period between wood and ferrous shipbuilding on the Great Lakes 
(Hoyt 2008:1-2).  R. J. Hackett, 1867, is generally recognized as the first modern bulk carrier in 
the Lakes trade (Figure 1.3; Devendorf 1995:7,53; Thompson 1991:22-23).  Its construction is a 
natural starting point for the data set.  The terminal year, 1900, was adopted as a round number, 
yielding a period of 33 years.  This period includes the nine year interval between 1888 and 1897 




(Chapter 2).  Of the 384 ships in the data set, 230 were wood.  Of this subset of 230 wooden 
ships, seven were of composite construction, wood with substantial structural use of steel or iron.  
The remaining 154 ships are of ferrous construction, four being constructed in iron, with the 
remaining 150 being steel.  Fifteen of these steel ships were whalebacks.   
This analysis is based on two assumptions and one unfortunate reality.  The first 
assumption is that ships somehow deserve the fates they get, and that if ship type ‘A’ in the 
aggregate outlives ship type ‘B,’ that type ‘A’ is demonstrably better.  Of course bad things 
happen to good people, and likewise, bad things may happen to good ships.  The second 
assumption is that any two ships and their careers are comparable.  In reality there are a thousand 
variables over the life of a ship: miles run, route, length of season, owners, power plant, weather, 
captain and crew, and on and on.  Proverbially, for want of a nail, the ship was lost, and we are in 
no position to count nails.  The unfortunate reality is that we have a finite number of Great Lakes 
freighters and a very finite number of whalebacks to compare.  In a perfect world, we would be 
able to run a thousand whalebacks and a thousand conventional freighters in a continuous circuit 
from Buffalo to Duluth, until some clear favorite emerged.  In practice, we have no such luxury.   
As a group, the 384 ships had an average lifespan of 33 years.  Two hundred and thirty 
ships, or 61%, burned, sank, wrecked, or sank as a result of a collision.  One hundred and fifty, 
or 39%, were scrapped.  Four, 1%, were sunk by enemy action in wartime.  Figure 5.1 shows 





FIGURE 5.1.  Cause of loss of all bulk freighters, including ferrous and wooden, but excluding 
barges. Average built tonnage: 2111.  Average final tonnage: 2159.  Average lifespan: 33 years.    
Burn: 50/384 = 13%.  Sank: 62/384 = 16%.  Wreck: 82/384 = 21%.  Collision:  36/384 = 9%.  
Scrapped 150/384 = 39%.  Other: 4/384 = 1%.  Natural causes: 150/380 = 39%.  Unnatural 
causes: 230/380 = 61%.   
 
There is a marked contrast between wood and ferrous ships, as might be expected.  Wood 
ships had an average lifespan of 25 years (Figure 5.2), as compared to an average lifespan of 45 
years for ferrous vessels.  No ferrous ships burned, but fifty wooden ships did.  It will surprise no 
one that the wooden ships proved more inflammable than their wooden counterparts, but the fact 
that a full 22%, nearly a quarter, of wooden ships ultimately burned is a rather stark figure.  
Interestingly enough, factoring out wooden vessels whose final disposition was a result of 
burning does nothing to improve the average longevity of the wooden fleet.  Wooden ships 
whose final disposition was a result of any cause other than burning still only had an average 
lifespan of 25 years (Figure 5.3).  This seems to reflect that, proclivity to burst into flames aside, 
wooden vessels were simply less robust than their ferrous counterparts.  With the vast majority, 










77%, of wooden ships meeting an untimely end by burning, sinking, wrecking, or collision, it 
seems that obsolescence was not a major factor, even though the period examined marks the 
transition between steel and ferrous vessels.  We might posit that wooden ships engaged in the 
strenuous bulk trade simply wore out faster than their steel counterparts, and that by their second 
decade they were living on borrowed time, but a thorough examination of the subject is beyond 
the scope of the present study. 
 
FIGURE 5.2.  Cause of loss of all wood freighters (no whalebacks) (includes composites.) :  
Average built tonnage : 1495.  Average final tonnage: 1532.  Average lifespan: 25 years.  Burn: 
50/230 = 22%.  Sank: 43/230 = 17%.  Wreck: 60/230 = 26%.  Collision: 23/230 = 10%.  
Scrapped: 54/230 = 23%.  Other: 0/230 = 0%.  Natural causes: 54/230 = 23%.  Unnatural causes: 
176/230 = 77%. 












FIGURE 5.3.  Cause of loss of wood vessels, excluding loss by burning (includes composites):  
Total years: 25.  Sank: 43/180 = 24%.  Wreck: 61/180 = 34%.  Collision: 23/180 = 13%.  
Scrapped: 53/180 = 30%. 
 
 Figure 5.4 shows cause of loss for all whaleback propellers.  Whaleback ships 
fare somewhat better than wooden ships, but somewhat worse than other ferrous ships in terms 
of longevity, at an average lifespan of 38 years; all other ferrous ships in the data set have an 
average longevity of 45 years (Figure 5.6).  Interestingly enough, within the field of ferrous bulk 
carriers, tonnage seems to have been a major predictor of longevity, as compared in Figures 5.4 
and 5.5.  When we control for tonnage, whaleback ships fare almost exactly the same as other 
ferrous ships.  The fifteen whaleback bulk freighters built on the Great Lakes ranged between 
1253 and 3686 gross tons.  Excluding ships of less than 1253 tons or greater than 3686 tons 
reduces the sample of ferrous ships to 85, by excluding two ships of less than 1253 tons and fifty 
ships of greater than 3686 tons.  Although the sample sizes involved are no doubt too small to be 
definitive, the 15 whaleback ships performed uncannily like the 85 ferrous vessels of comparable 
tonnage.  Twenty per cent of the whalebacks sank, as compared with 19% of the comparable 









tonnage ferrous vessels.  Twenty per cent of each category wrecked.  Seven per cent of each 
category sank as a result of collision.  Fifty three per cent of the whalebacks survived to be 
scrapped, compared with 49% of ferrous vessels of comparable tonnage.  Five percent of the 
comparable tonnage ferrous vessels sank as a result of enemy action in wartime, with no 
comparable losses from the whaleback fleet.  The whaleback ships had an average lifespan of 38 
years, compared with 37 years for the ferrous vessels of similar tonnage.   
 
 
FIGURE 5.4.  Cause of loss of whaleback propellers: Average tons built: 2006.  Average final 
tonnage: 2097.  Average Lifespan: 38 years.  Burn 0/15 = 0%.  Sank: 3/15= 20%.  Wreck: 3/15 = 
20%.  Collision: 1/15 = 7%.  Scrapped: 8/15 = 53%.  Other 0/15 = 0%.  Natural: 8/15 = 53%.  












FIGURE 5.5. Cause of loss of ferrous vessels, tonnage comparable to whalebacks (1253 -3686 
built tonnage):  This excludes only two vessels of tonnage less than whalebacks (i.e. less than 
1253.)  This excludes fifty vessels of tonnage greater than 3686.  Average lifespan: 37 years.  
Burn: 0/85 = 0%.  Sank: 16/85 = 19%.  Wrecked: 17/85 = 20%.  Collision: 6/85 = 7%.  
Scrapped:  42/85 = 49%.  Other (War): 4/85 = 5%.  Natural causes: 42/81 = 52%.  Unnatural 
causes: 39/81 = 48%. 
  
Ferrous, Tonnage Comparable to Whalebacks 











FIGURE 5.6.  Cause of loss of all ferrous freighters, excluding whalebacks (includes steel and 
iron): Average built tonnage: 3142.  Average final tonnage: 3204.  Average lifespan: 45 years.  
Burn: 0/139 = 0%.  Sank: 16/139 = 12%.  Wreck: 19/139: 14%.  Collision: 12/139 = 9%.  
Scrapped: 88/139 = 63%.  Other: 4/139 = 3%.  Natural causes: 88/135 = 65%.  Unnatural causes: 
47/135 = 35%.       
When we examine only ferrous vessels over 4000 tons, an admittedly arbitrary round 
number adopted for convenience, it becomes apparent that tonnage was a strong predictor of 
longevity (Figure 5.7).  This subset includes 44 vessels, all built between 1896 and 1900, and 
correlates closely with the Sault lock improvements of 1895/1896.  This increased longevity is 
probably because after a certain tipping point, ships had arrived at a size relative to the capacity 
of locks, canals and rivers in the Great Lakes which remained competitive for a longer time.  We 
might also look to overall improvements in the safety of navigation, including the adoption of 
wireless radios, improvements to lighthouses and other aids to navigation, and the like.  At any 
rate, these larger vessels had an average longevity of 58 years, with 89% meeting a final 
disposition due to natural causes, such as scrapping. 
Ferrous, Excluding Whalebacks (Includes 











FIGURE 5.7. Cause of loss of vessels of 4000 tons or greater, all ferrous.  Average built tonnage: 
4796.  Average Final tonnage: 4833.  All built 1896-1900.  Average years: 58.  Burn: 0/44.  
Sank: 0/44 = 0%.  Wreck: 1/44 = 2%.  Collision: 4/44 = 9%.  Scrapped: 39/44 = 89%.  Natural 
causes: 39/44 = 89%.  Unnatural causes: 5/44 = 11%. 
 
Twenty six whalebacks were barges.  They are presented here, but comparing them 
directly with steamers is problematic.  Unlike ships, barges are not even typically graced with 
proper names.  McDougall’s first whaleback, a barge, in which he must have invested a 
significant amount of pride and joy, as well as most of his money, was christened simply 101.  
Even if the resources exist to make a fairly comprehensive list of barges operating on the Lakes 
in the late nineteenth century, and this is by no means certain, it would require a significant 
amount of dredging through sources.  The data thus harvested would be of the muddiest sort, 
because bulk trade barges during the transition from wood to steel were such a mixed lot.  Many 
barges were converted sailing vessels, others were ships stripped of their engines at the end of 
their useful lives, and pressed into a few more years of service.  Towards the turn of the century, 
the popularity of the consort barge model waned, further distorting the picture.  Thus, if 










comparing bulk freighters is somewhat like comparing apples and oranges, and sometimes 
bananas as well, comparing the whole inhomogeneous lot of barges would be akin to comparing 
codfish and cabbages.  Whaleback barges are analyzed as a way of filling out a too small pool of 
whaleback vessels, but it must be recognized that this analyses takes place in a limited context.  
As can be seen in Figure 5.8, whaleback barges experienced shorter lives and more unnatural 
losses than any type of powered ship in the data set, even wooden ones. 
 
FIGURE 5.8.  Cause of loss of whaleback barges:  Average tons built: 810.  Average final 
tonnage: 810.  Average Lifespan: 18 years.  Burn: 1/26 = 4%.  Sank: 10/26 = 38%.  Wreck: 4/26 
= 15%.  Collision: 3/26 = 12%.  Scrapped: 6/26 = 23%.  Other: 1/26 = 4%.  Natural causes: 6/26 
= 23%.  Other: 1/25 = 4%.  Unnatural causes: 18/26 = 69%. 
 
As a distinct group of vessels, there is compelling evidence that whalebacks were no less 
successful than the conventional freighters with which they competed.  Although the sample set 
available is not large enough to preclude all doubt, analysis of the lifespan and cause of loss of 
all Great Lakes freighters in the latter half of the nineteenth century is highly suggestive.  When 











tonnage, it becomes apparent that whaleback freighters were no more subject to loss and in fact 
enjoyed slightly longer lifetimes in active service than the conventional freighters.  In fact, the 
most reliable predictor of longevity was found to be tonnage, suggesting that the critical factor in 
whaleback obsolescence was the failure of ASBC to continue producing whalebacks was that 
they were made of metal.  Nearly a quarter of wooden bulk freighters met their end by fire, 
compared to none of the ferrous ships.  Further, even when losses by fire are excluded, ferrous 
ships dramatically outperformed wooden ships in key metrics: wooden ships were roughly twice 
as likely to meet a catastrophic premature end as ferrous ones; ferrous ships had an active service 
life roughly 50% longer than wooden ones. As Thompson notes, “an average of about 10% of the 
ships [on the Great Lakes] fell victim to a casualty of one sort or another each season” during the 
period between1878 and 1897 (Thompson 2000:22).  While the Great Lakes were a dangerous 
environment, it appears that improvements in shipbuilding did much to ameliorate the danger.  A 
large proportion of these losses could represent the wooden fleet winnowing itself out.  As 
Figure 5.9 shows, the strongest predictors of longevity, barges excluded, were material of 





FIGURE 5.9.  Average longevity of vessel categories, measured in years. 
whalebacks long enough to produce a cohort adapted to the new Poe Locks opened at Sault 
Sainte Marie in 1896.  The data further strongly implies that the most remarkable thing about 
 
The clear implication is that the design peculiarities of whalebacks were barely relevant 
to their performance, at least as measured by their disposition.    In the 1880s and early 1890s, 
any model of ferrous ship was so far superior to the preceding generations of wooden ships that 
the relative differences between the ferrous models proved inconsequential.  The right answer to 














Examining other metrics of performance also implies that whalebacks were substantially 
comparable to their contemporaries.  With a midships coefficient measured at 0.981 for Frank 
Rockefeller, a typical whaleback propeller (Weaver 1960:2), it can be seen that the slightly 
rounded cross-section did little to impede carrying capacity.  As a successor to the “floating boot 
box” design of R.J. Hackett, they were not lacking. 
 When tested at the Department of the Navy’s David Taylor Model Basin, a model of 
Frank Rockefeller performed very well: 
The flow about this hull is considered very good within the speed range 
within which it was designed to operate.  The flow around the bow is 
smooth, uninterrupted, and almost radial from the centerline.  Flow studies 
indicate a “dead water area” just forward of where the propeller aperture 
would normally be, from about the 12-foot waterline to the water surface.  
At speeds above 18 knots the bow wave becomes quite large, as would be 
expected; however at these speeds the flow about the stern improves 
(Weaver 1960:2). 
 
 McDougall was only really an outlier in the narrow field of Great Lakes shipbuilding:   
(Builders) enjoyed an attractive position in the shipbuilding trade 
because of the limited access to saltwater from the lakes and, in 
turn, did not have to face the type of domestic and foreign 
competition which bred progressive innovation.  Rather, they were 
limited by geographic features, by a local or regional trade and as 
the iron ore fields developed, by the peculiarities of bulk 
transportation (Wright 1969:2). 
 
McDougall’s whalebacks tend to be taken as far more aberrant than they actually were, in part 
because Great Lakes shipbuilders have sown such a monoculture.  Whalebacks’ underlying 
vernacularism is masked by the otherwise overwhelming orthodoxy of Great Lakes bulk 
freighter construction.  As has been shown, they performed similarly to their contemporaries in 




Numerous factors have been cited as leading to the whalebacks’ demise: small hatches, 
internal framing that wasn’t readily scalable and small size overall, being some of the most 
commonly repeated (Zoss 2007:8-9; Wright 1969:52; Devendorf 1995:9; Massie 1990:159).  
However all of these were issues that arose after the last generation of whalebacks were 
designed, either as a result of the expansion of the locks at Sault Ste. Marie in 1895/1896 or after 
the introduction of Hulett Unloaders in 1898 (Daley 2000:61).  These challenges were overcome 
by conventional freighter designers when they arose, and there is nothing inherent in the 
whaleback design which would prevent them from being overcome there too. 
Hatch covers were a continuing weak point in Lakers, traditionally wood planks, covered by 
canvas tarpaulins.  This genuinely ancient system persisted on the Lakes until well into the 
twentieth century (Thompson 2000: 239-241;334).  McDougall’s system, a single steel plate, 
typically about 8 feet by ten feet, bolted over each hatch opening, was unwieldy, and since each 
had to be moved by hand, inherently limited in size, but it was a tremendous advance over the 
previous method Daley 2000:60).  The telescoping Hatch Cover, patented in 1906 by Joe Kidd, 
McDougall’s former yard supervisor and right hand man, was a major innovation in Great Lakes 
freighter technology, and might have made whalebacks competitive during the twentieth century 






FIGURE 5.10.  The Telescoping Hatch Cover (US Patent #833,058, 1906).  
The fitting and moving of large single-piece hatch covers was finally addressed with the 
introduction of the Wood patent hatch cover in 1925.  In this system, an overhead deck crane 
travelling on two fore-and-aft tracks was fitted for the sole purpose of shifting hatch covers 
(Daley 2000:60-61). 
 Shore-mounted unloading equipment peaked with the introduction of the Hulett 
Unloader.  The clamshell at the right side of Figure 5.11 was lowered into ships holds by the 
operator in a small cabin just above.  “When Hulett Unloaders entered service in 1898, every 
vessel on the Great Lakes engaged in the iron ore trade suddenly faced the same problem (Daley 




parameter that had not been relevant when the ships were built.  Had McDougall persisted in 
developing whalebacks, these shortcomings would likely have been addressed.   
 
FIGURE 5.11.  Hulett Unloader.  (Postcard, CT Photographs, Postmarked 1914).  
 
 One noteworthy detriment of the whaleback design, apparently unaddressed in the 
literature was a functional inability to carry a meaningful amount of cargo above the waterline, 
as when a whaleback was fully laden, its weather deck was barely above water level.  Thus, 
James B. Colgate, a whaleback of 308’ length, 38’ beam, and 24’ draft had a cargo capacity of 
1713 gross tonnage (Devendorf 1995:80), whereas the conventional freighter Vega of almost 
identical scantlings of 301.2’ length, 38.5’ beam, and 21.1’ draft measured 2144 gross tons 
(Devendorf 1995: 82).  This is a rough comparison, and gross tonnage is a rough measurement, 
but it is significant that the gross tonnage of the conventional freighter is 25% greater.  This is 
not necessarily to say that the conventional freighter could carry 25% more cargo; regardless of 
internal volume, a ship and its cargo cannot be heavier than the water they displace.  Thus, for a 




less dense cargo, such as grain, the comparative difference in gross tonnage would have mattered 
more.  Conventional freighter did not necessarily maintain a large amount of freeboard when 
loaded.  Figure 5.12 shows whalebacks and conventional freighters side by side.  Bartlett, far 
right, was one of the 15 whaleback steamers in the bulk trade, and is flanked by barges 105 and 
118 on her port side (Table 1.1; Table 1.2).  The wooden freighter Wallula, built 1882 
(Devendorf 1995:59), is at the left foreground.  Note the Wallula’s modest amount of freeboard, 
perhaps eight feet, judging by the figures in frame 
 
FIGURE 5.12.  Ships wait to transit the locks at Sault Ste. Marie (Postcard, Detroit Publishing 
Company, circa 1900).
 
 This comparative difference in gross tonnage may have been less meaningful in the 
unsettled framework of Lakes trade at the end of the nineteenth century.  Multiple destabilizing 
elements, including the shift from wooden to ferrous construction technologies, relatively 
frequent changes in infrastructure, and the consort system complicated direct comparison 




steady patterns, small differences in incremental carrying capacity between vessels would have 
become more meaningful, making whalebacks less and less relatively competitive.  When the 
current iterations of the Sault locks were reached, were whalebacks still in production, they 
presumably would have grown to fill every available inch of the locks, as conventional freighters 
have.  Then, the only direction left in which to grow would have been up, minimizing and 
probably eventually effacing the difference between whalebacks and conventional freighters.  
However this sort of reasoning things out to their logical extreme based on only one parameter 
has obvious limits.  The entire saga of whalebacks is shot through with human factors that 
shaped the ostensibly simple economic question of what shape a ship should be.  
Conclusion 
When an apple has ripened and falls, why does it fall?  
Because of its attraction to the earth, because its stalk withers, 
because it is dried by the sun, because it grows heavier, 
because the wind shakes it, or because the boy standing below 
wants to eat it? 
 
Nothing is the cause.  All this is only the coincidence of 
conditions in which all vital organic and elemental events 
occur.  And the botanist who finds that the apple falls because 
the cellular tissue decays and so forth is equally right with the 
child who stands under the tree and says the apple fell because 
he wanted to eat it and prayed for it.  Equally right or wrong is 
he who says that Napoleon went to Moscow because he 
wanted to, and perished because Alexander desired his 
destruction, and he who says that an undermined hill weighing 
a million tons fell because the last navvy struck it for the last 
time with his mattock.  In historic events the so-called great 
men are labels giving names to events, and like labels they 
have but the smallest connection with the event itself. 
 
Every act of theirs, which appears to them as an act of their 
own will, is in an historical sense involuntary and is related to 






 While it seems unnecessary to argue here either for or against predestination, it is useful 
for our attention to rest for a moment on the idea of narrative in history, and how it almost 
inevitably attaches itself to famous personages.  Language, especially written language, 
structures human thought in a number of ways.  Among other things, our minds, pattern 
recognition devices by nature, have a proclivity for imposing narrative structures on events.  We 
instinctively connect events through perceived causality, and link these events into stories that 
have a beginning, a middle, and end, and one or more main characters, upon which we pin these 
events.  We weave whatever threads we find into a text that satisfies our need for narrative (Ong 
1982).   
 As seen in Chapter 2, at the height of the Gilded Age, the American narrative emphasized 
progress through innovation.  Whalebacks were largely seen through this lens.  Indeed, the 
expectation of progress may have been an underlying reason that McDougall initially found 
backing for his project.  Further, the tendency of capital to concentrate around wealthy 
industrialists, and the uniquely empowering patent environment of the time conspired to make 
McDougall the protagonist of his own narrative in a way which would have been much less 
possible only a few decades before or a few decades after.  He was in the right place at the right 
time, not only in the world of technology and market forces, but also in the world of narrative 
expectation.  However, viewed from a certain remove, it becomes clear that whalebacks are not 
wholly explained as the rise and fall of one man and of one design, but as a crest in a continuum, 
of ideas of vessel design which had their genesis in the introduction of a new shipbuilding 
medium, and which, in some form, continue up to the present. 
 As whalebacks have receded into the past, a more ancient and less positive narrative has 




is a whiff of expectation that they must have done so in dramatic fashion.  Mariners may function 
in our thoughts as a sort of universal foreigner, a timeless ‘other,’ and we look on their tragedies 
with peculiar sangfroid.  This there are innumerable books with titles like Shipwreck, 
Shipwreck!, 100 Best Great Lakes Shipwrecks, and so on.  These titles apparently do not strike 
the book-buying public as particularly inappropriate; however, something like Bus Wreck!, or 
100 Best Airline Crash Sites would resonate as downright ghoulish.  At least part of this must be 
a cultural expectation that it is natural for ships to wreck and a certain titillation in the spectacle 
when they do.  A ship in a storm is perhaps the most iconic example of the narrative convention 
of man versus nature; it is hardly surprising that we should come to expect these patterns to play 
out. 
 There is seemingly an aversion towards conceiving of these vessels as largely 
unremarkable in their performance, as evidenced by the author who proclaims “the ships proved 
themselves to be excellent bulk cargo carriers, able to weather any conditions better than 
conventional ships could” (Kohl 2007:66-67). 
When the Christian Science Monitor reported the scrapping of the last whaleback in the 
Great Lakes bulk trade in 1936, although others carried on in other trades for many years, it 
offered this analysis: 
The advantage of this type of construction over the conventional 
design now universally followed, was, as far as seamen here can 
tell, chiefly that it was possible to roll through heavy seas without 
shipping water.  The main reason though, one ‘salt’ insists, is 
simply that it was an idea, just as the building of automobiles 
recently with fender skirts was an idea that ‘took on.’  Other 
builders found no reason to adopt this idea and lake freighters now 






The old salt who insists that it was an idea that took on, a passing fashion, shall have (nearly) the 
last word, as he is seemingly as right as anyone.  Albeit in curves, whalebacks were essentially 










American Steel Barge Company, Moses E. Clapp, Joseph L. Colby, Hoyt Colgate, Joseph Bell 
Cotton, Frederick Taylor Gates, M. M. Howland, et al.  
1885. American Steel Barge Company papers. Unpublished archival material on microfilm: 
Minnesota Historical Society Library. 
 
1888-1898 Amship Predecessors: American Steel Barge Company Hulls 102-145/146.  
Unpublished archival ships line drawings and plans: Historical Collection of the Great Lakes, 
Bowling Green State University. 
 
Brassey, Thomas Allnutt 
1888 The Naval Annual.  J. Griffin and Company, Portsmouth, UK. 
 
Calthorp, Samuel R. 
1865 Improvement in Construction of Railway Trains and Cars.  U.S. Patent 49,227, no filing 
date listed, issued August 8, 1865. 
 
Christian Science Monitor 
1936 Last Whaleback of Great Lakes is Being Junked.  Christian Science Monitor 15 
October:16. 
 
Cornell, Felix M. and Allan C. Hoffman (editors) 
1957 American Merchant Seaman’s Manual, Fifth Edition. Cornell Maritime Press, 
Centreville, MD. 
 
Crowell and Murray Inc. 
1927 The Iron Ores of Lake Superior: Containing Some Facts of Interest Relating to Mining, 
Beneficiation and Shipping of the ore and Location of Principal Mines, Sixth edition. The Penton 
Press Co, Cleveland, OH. 
 
Doxford, Charles David. 
1908 Turret Vessel.  U.S. Patent 869,900, filed June 24, 1907, and issued August 25, 1908. 
 
Gates, Frederick Taylor 
1977 Chapters in My Life. The Free Press, New York, NY. 
 
Goodall, F. C. 










Hawthorne, William Rede and John Christopher Shuldham Shaw. 
1961 Vessels for Transporting or Storing Liquids or Fluidisable Solids.  U.S. Patent 2,997,973, 
filed January 6, 1958, and issued August 29, 1961.  
 
Hayler, William B. (editor) 




1906 Hatch-Cover for Ships.  U.S. Patent 833,058, filed December 13, 1905, and issued 
October 9, 1906. 
 
Knight, Austin M. 
1945 Knight’s Modern Seamanship, Eleventh Edition. D. Van Nostrand Company, New York, 
NY. 
 
Linblad, Anders Frederick 
1924 A Critical Analysis of the Factors Affecting Safety and Economy of Operation of the Bulk 
Freight Vessels of the Great Lakes. The Marine Review, Cleveland, OH. 
 
Los Angeles Times 
1892 A Whaleback Excursion Steamer.  Los Angeles Times 4 December:6.  Los Angeles, CA. 
 
McDougall, Alexander 
1881 Tow Boat.  U.S. Patent 241,813.  Filed March 9, 1880, and issued May 24, 1881. 
 
1888 Tow Boat.  U.S. Patent 393,997.  Filed April 28, 1888, and issued December 4, 1888. 
 
1932 The Autobiography of Captain Alexander McDougall.  McDougall and Castle, Duluth, 
MN. Reprinted 1968 by The Great Lakes Historical Society, Cleveland, OH. 
 
Mulrooney, J. M. and F. M. Barton 
1896 Blue Book of American Shipping, 1896. Marine Review, Cleveland, OH. 
 
Rockefeller, John D. Sr. 




1877 Cleopatra’s Needle. Scientific American Supplement.  28 April:69. 
 
Tunnell, George Gerard 
1898 Transportation on the Great Lakes of North America.  Doctoral Dissertation, Department 






1787 Constitution of the United States.  The Charters of Freedom, 
<http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html>. Accessed 24 
December 2015. 
 
The Washington Post 
1891 The “Whaleback” a Success.  The Washington Post 11 November:4.  Washington, DC. 
 
Weaver, A. H. Jr. 
Resistance and Flow Data for a Whaleback Steamer Hull Form, Model 4760.  Department of the 
Navy, David Taylor Model Basin. Hydromechanics Laboratory Research and Development 
Report, Report 1449.  
 
Winans, Ross and Thomas Winans. 
1859 Improvement in Hulls of Steam Vessels.  U.S. Patent 651, reissued January 25, 1859. 
 
Secondary Sources  
Baker, William A., and Tre Tryckare 
1965 The Engine Powered Vessel.  Crescent Books, New York, NY. 
 
Bal, Mieke 
1997 Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative, 2nd edition.  University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, ON. 
 
Barry, James P.  
 1973 Ships of the Great Lakes: 300 Years of Navigation. Howell - North Books, Berkley, CA. 
 
Benford, Harry 
1991 Naval Architecture for Non-Naval Architects.  The Society of Naval Arrchitects and 
Marine Engineers, Jersey City, NJ. 
 
Bowen, Dana Thomas 
1946 Memories of the Great Lakes.   Freshwater Press, Cleveland, OH. 
 
Chernow, Ron 
1997 The Death of the Banker.  Vintage Books, New York, NY. 
 
1998 Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Jr.  Vintage Books, New York, NY. 
 
Clark, Robert 
1998 The Advent of the Whalebacks on the Great Lakes.  Nor’easter: Journal of the Lake 
Superior Marine Museum Association 23(5):1-5. 
 




2000 “Pigs” on the Water: Technological Failure and Great Lakes Shipbuilding Innovation, 
1880 – 1905.  Master’s Thesis, Department of History, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI. 
 
De Camp, L. Sprague 
1961 The Heroic Age of American Invention.  Doubleday and Company, Garden City, NY. 
 
De Kruif, Paul 
1929 Seven Iron Men.  Harcourt, Brace and Company.  New York, NY. 
 
Devendorf, John F. 
1995 Great Lakes Bulk Carriers 1869-1985.  Apollo Printing and Graphics Center, South 
Bend, IN. 
 
Dickinson, John N. 
1981 To Build a Canal: Saulte Ste. Marie, 1853-1854 and After.  Miami University by The 
Ohio State University Press, Columbus, OH. 
 
Engman, Elmer 




2008 Pigs at Sea: The Sinking of the James B. Colgate.  Print Production, Dispatch Printing, 
Erie, PA 
 
Galbraith, John Kenneth 
1976 The Affluent Society, 3rd edition.  The New American Library, Inc., New York, NY. 
 
1977 The Age of Uncertainty.  Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA. 
 
Garreau, Joel 
1982 The Nine Nations of North America.  Avon Books, New York, NY. 
 
Gray, Leonard and John Lingwood 
1975 The Doxford Turret Ships.  The World Ship Society, Kendal, Cumbria, UK. 
 
Guthrie, John 
1970 Bizarre Ships of the Nineteenth Century.  A.S. Barnes and Company, New York, NY. 
 
Harland, John 
1984 Seamanship in the Age of Sail.  Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 
 
Hatcher, Harlan and Erich A. Walter 
1963 A Pictorial History of the Great Lakes.  Bonanza Books, New York, NY. 
 




2015 Great Lakes Vessel Database, Historical Collection of the Great Lakes, Bowling Green 
State University, OH <https://www.bgsu.edu/library/cac/collections/hcgl.html>.  Accessed 2009 
through 2015. 
 
Hoyt, Joseph Clayton 
2008 The Transition from Wood to Iron in Great Lakes Bulk Carriers: An Historical and 
Archaeological Investigation of the Wooden Bulk Carrier Continental, and early Iron Hulled 
Bulk Carriers. Master’s thesis, Department of History, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC. 
 
Keegan, John 
1976 The Face of Battle.  Penguin Books, New York, NY. 
 
Khan, Zorina 
2005 The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic 
Development, 1790-1920.  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Kohl, Chris 
2007 The Sagamore: a Whaleback of the Freshwater Seas.  Wreck Diving Magazine 14:64-71. 
 
Lafferty, William 
1998 Technological Innovation in Great Lakes Shipping: Leathem D. Smith and the Rise of the 
Self-Unloader, In “A Fully Accredited Ocean”: Essays on the Great Lakes, Victoria Brehm, 
editor, pp. 155-198.  The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI. 
 
Larson, Erik 
2003 The Devil in the White City.  Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, New York, 
NY. 
 
Livingstone, W. A. 




2015 Russia’s Revolutionary Round Ship.  PowerShips, 293.  Steamship Historical Society of 
America, East Providence, RI. 
 
LesStrang, Jacques. 
1977 Lake Carriers: The Saga of the Great Lakes Fleet: North America’s Fresh Water 
Merchant Marine. Salisbury Press, Seattle, WA. 
 
Lydecker, Ryck 
1973 Pigboat: The Story of the Whalebacks. Sweetwater Press, Duluth, MN. 
 
Mansfield, J. B. 
1899 History of the Great Lakes: Illustrated in Two Volumes.  J.H. Beers & Co, Chicago, IL.  





Massie, Larry B. 
1990 Pig Boats and River Hogs: Further Voyages into Michigan’s Past.  The Priscilla Press, 
Allegan Forest, MI. 
 
Mills, James Cooke 
1976 Our Inland Seas: Their Shipping and Commerce for Three Centuries.  Freshwater Press, 
Cleveland, OH. 
 
Morris, Charles R. 
2005 The Tycoons: How Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Jay Gould, and J. P. Morgan 
Invented the American Supereconomy.  Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY. 
 
Nassaw, David 
2006 Andrew Carnegie. Penguin Books, New York, NY. 
 
Ong, Walter   
1982 Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. Rutledge, New York, NY. 
 
Pellet, C. Roger 
2006 The Machinery of the Steamship Meteor.  C. Roger Pellet, Superior, WI. 
 
2007 Drawings for Whaleback Barges and Steamships.  Nautical Research Journal 53 (3):131-
140. 
 
2008 Whaleback Steamship Meteor: SIA Preservation Grant Update. Society for Industrial 
Archaeology Newsletter 37 (1):4-5. 
 
Rodgers, Bradley A., and Russell T. Green 
2003 Of Limestone and Labor: Shipwrecks of the Stone Trade: The 1999 Bullhead Point Stone 
Barge Investigation, Phase II. East Carolina University, Program in Maritime History and 
Nautical Archaeology, Research Report No. 11, Greenville, NC. 
 
Rodgers, Bradley A., James D. Moore III, Annalies Corbin, Jacqueline D. Piero, and Andrew 
Pietruszka 
2006 From Quarry to Quay: Shipwrecks of McCracken's Cove: The 2001-2002 Sturgeon Bay 
Wreck and Wharf Investigation at the Birmingham Site. East Carolina University, Program in 
Maritime Studies, Research Report No. 17, Greenville, NC. 
 
Thompson, Mark L. 
1991 Steamboats and Sailors of the Great Lakes. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI. 
 
1994 Queen of the Lakes.  Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI. 
 





Tolstoy, Leo   




2004 Introduction to Naval Architecture, Fourth Edition.  Elsevier, Butterworth and 
Heinemann, London, UK. 
 
Vachon, Paul 
2009 Images of America: Forgotten Detroit.  Arcadia Publishing, Charleston, SC. 
 
Van Dorn, William G. 
1974 Oceanography and Seamanship.  Dodd, Mead, and Company, New York, NY. 
 
Von Clausewitz, Karl 
1943 On War.  O. J. Matthijs Jolles, translator.  Random House, New York, NY. 
 
Wicker, Elmus 
2000 Banking Panics of the Gilded Age.  Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. 
 
Wilson, Erasmus 
1878 Cleopatra’s Needle.  Brain and Company, London, UK. 
 
Wilterding, John H. Jr. 
1969 McDougall’s Dream: The American Whaleback.  Badger Bay Printers, Green Bay, WI. 
 
Wright, Richard J. 
1969 Freshwater Whales: A History of The American Shipbuilding Company and its 
Predecessors.  Kent State University Press, Kent, OH.   
 
Zoss, Neel R. 
2006 Hull Design and Alteration in Early Whaleback Barges.  Nautical Research Journal 
51(4):212-222. 
 







APPENDIX A: DATA SET AND COMMENTARY 
Data Set Parameters and Methodology: 
This data set attempts to compare the longevity of various types of Great Lakes bulk 
carriers built before 1900.  Compiling a data set of this description is attended by certain 
difficulties.  In practice, one may find himself comparing not only apples and oranges, but half of 
the rest of the produce section as well.  There are no graven conclusions here, only trends and 
suggestions.  Let he who cites do so at his own peril, having read the methodology lain out 
below. 
This data set was compiled using Devendorf’s Great Lakes Bulk Carriers and the Great 
Lakes Vessel Database maintained by Bowling Green State University as part of the Historical 
Collection of the Great Lakes (Devendorf 1995:50-94; Historical Collection of the Great Lakes).  
It thus relies primarily on secondary sources.  It was suggested by the data set used in Joseph 
Hoyt’s thesis (Hoyt 2008:204-211) but incorporates a somewhat greater number of ships, and 
tracks a larger number of variables.  Daley, Lydecker, Wilterding and several others list the final 
disposition of the various vessels in the whaleback fleet, with Daley breaking down these 
dispositions by cause (Daley 2000:104-105).  To the author’s knowledge, the longevity and 
cause of final disposition of whaleback freighters has not been compared statistically with the 
broader bulk carrier fleet.   
The data set is composed of 410 vessels, including 41 of the 44 whaleback vessels built.  
Of the whalebacks, the City of Everett, the Sagamore, and the Christopher Columbus are 
excluded, as none operated in the Great Lakes bulk trade.  The City of Everett was built on the 




confused with the whaleback barge Sagamore, was built in and sailed out of England.  The 
Christopher Columbus operated solely in the passenger trade.   
  A relatively broad definition of bulk carrier has been adopted, comprising any vessel 
which has been identified as working in the bulk trade on the Great Lakes at some point in its 
career under power.  Vessels engaged in the bulk trade for a period which were subsequently 
retired to other trades, such as lumber carrying, tankering, or car-ferrying are included, on the 
premise that they retained the same basic build which allowed them to operate in the bulk trade.  
Exclusively sailing bulk carriers and barges have been omitted as separate beasts, except for the 
smaller subset of whaleback barges, for reasons explained above.  Barges that were later 
equipped with engines are included in the sample. 
A number of vessels were moved off the Great Lakes at some point in their careers.  
These vessels still appear in the statistics, on the premise that to exclude them from the sample, 
or to count emigration from the Lakes as a career ending event would distort results more than 
leaving them in, unfairly penalizing ships that were evidently robust enough to find a buyer.  
Examination might find that this phenomenon tended to be greatest during wartime, or other 
periods of high demand.  At any rate, it is supposed that it affected all types of ferrous bulk 
carriers more or less equally, and thus has minimal statistical impact. 
 
Columns in the Data Set are as Follows: 
 Name:  Only the original name of each vessel is given.  As more than a few vessels 





 Construction:  Vessels are identified as primarily wood, iron or steel in construction.  
A small number of bulk carriers were built as composites, wood planks on iron or 
steel frames.  As these were relatively few composite bulk carriers on the Lakes, and 
a similarly small number of iron bulk carriers, reference will primarily be made to 
ferrous and non-ferrous vessels. 
 Ton (Built): Tonnage as built, measured in gross tons.  Gross tons are defined by the 
appropriate certificating body (i.e. Canadian or American.)  Note that in cases of 
vessels sold over the border, gross tonnage can change as a result of differing 
standards of admeasurements, but that these changes are generally minor.  Tonnage is 
conventionally expressed in round numbers. 
 Ton (Final): Tonnage at time of final disposition.  Larger variances usually indicate 
lengthening or cutting down.  On the balance, the difference between built and final 
tonnage is minor.  Note that a vessel might conceivably be built, subsequently 
lengthened, and finally cut down, and that its intermediate, largest, size would not be 
represented here. 
 Length: Length in feet, as built.  All figures are rounded down to the nearest foot, on 
the premise that the vessels involved are large enough to spare a few inches. 
 Launched: Year launched. 
 End: Year of final disposition.  Final disposition is defined here as a career ending 
event.  Some subjectivity has inevitably become involved, but generally, events 
which would, for insurance purposes be considered a total loss, such as burning to the 
waterline, or sinking, have been considered career ending events, even if the vessel or 




 Total Years: The difference between the year of launch and year of final disposition.  
Note that day and month are not taken into account, thus, for example, a vessel might 
be launched on December 31, 1899, and sunk on January 1, 1900, and still credited 
with a full year.  The inaccuracies thus introduced are not considered significant. 
 Burn/Sank/Wreck/Collision/Scrapped/Other:  The final disposition of the vessel, as 
neatly as can be determined.  A ship, for example, might run aground, catch on fire 
and burn to the waterline, drift free and sink, and subsequently be salvaged and 
rebuilt.  In this instance, grounding, as the root cause of the career ending event, 
would be indicated as the final disposition of the vessel. 
 Burn: Unintentional fire was the cause of final disposition.  Every effort has been 
made to distinguish between vessels burned intentional as part of the abandonment 
process and vessels burned unintentionally. 
 Sank:  Vessel sank in open water, for any of a variety of reasons, most typically 
heavy weather.  Intentional grounding to prevent sinking, which resulted in loss, is 
counted as sinking. 
 Wreck:  Vessel wrecked, grounded, or stranded, or in any other fashion allided with a 
fixed object. 
 Collision:  Vessel sank as a result of a collision with another vessel.   
 Scrapped:  Vessel was scrapped, abandoned, laid up, or repurposed, recognizing that 
it had completed its career as a powered vessel without a career ending mishap.  
Vessels reduced to barges are considered scrapped, on the presumption that they had 
filled out their useful careers as powered vessels.  Repurposing also includes such 




 Other:  Vessels sunk due to enemy action in wartime, or lost by some other 
anomalous means.  In practice, all vessels appearing in the “other” column were lost 
in wartime. 
 Natural? : Whether, as it were, vessel was lost to natural causes, e. g., scrapped or 
similarly disposed. 
 Whale? : Whether vessel is considered a whaleback. 
 Comments:  Chiefly related to the cause of loss. 
Selected Statistics Derived from the Data Set 
All Ships (includes whalebacks, excludes barges):  Average built tonnage: 2111.  Average final 
tonnage: 2159.  Average lifespan: 33 years.    Burn: 50/384 = 13%.  Sank: 62/384 = 16%.  
Wreck: 82/384 = 21%.  Collision:  36/384 = 9%.  Scrapped 150/384 = 39%.  Other: 4/384 = 1%.  
Natural causes: 150/380 = 39%.  Unnatural causes: 230/380 = 61%.   
 
Whaleback propellers: Average tons built: 2006.  Average final tonnage: 2097.  Average 
Lifespan: 38 years.  Burn 0/15 = 0%.  Sank: 3/15= 20%.  Wreck: 3/15 = 20%.  Collision: 1/15 = 
7%.  Scrapped: 8/15 = 53%.  Other 0/15 = 0%.  Natural: 8/15 = 53%.  Unnatural causes: 47%. 
 
All wood (no whalebacks) (includes composites.):  Average built tonnage: 1495.  Average final 
tonnage: 1532.  Average lifespan: 25 years.  Burn: 50/230 = 22%.  Sank: 43/230 = 17%.  Wreck: 
60/230 = 26%.  Collision: 23/230 = 10%.  Scrapped: 54/230 = 23%.  Other: 0/230 = 0%.  Natural 
causes: 54/230 = 23%.  Unnatural causes: 176/230 = 77%. 
 
Ferrous, excluding whalebacks (includes steel and iron): Average built tonnage: 3142.  Average 
final tonnage: 3204.  Average lifespan: 45 years.  Burn: 0/139 = 0%.  Sank: 16/139 = 12%.  
Wreck: 19/139: 14%.  Collision: 12/139 = 9%.  Scrapped: 88/139 = 63%.  Other: 4/139 = 3%.  
Natural causes: 88/135 = 65%.  Unnatural causes: 47/135 = 35%.       
 
Ferrous, tonnage comparable to whalebacks (1253 -3686 built tonnage):  This excludes only two 
vessels of tonnage less than whalebacks (i.e. less than 1253.)  This excludes fifty vessels of 
tonnage greater than 3686.  Average lifespan: 37 years.  Burn: 0/85 = 0%.  Sank: 16/85 = 19%.  
Wrecked: 17/85 = 20%.  Collision: 6/85 = 7%.  Scrapped:  42/85 = 49%.  Other (War): 4/85 = 





4k Club:  Vessels of 4000 tons or greater, all ferrous.  Average built tonnage: 4796.  Average 
Final tonnage: 4833.  All built 1896-1900.  Average years: 58.  Burn: 0/44.  Sank: 0/44 = 0%.  
Wreck: 1/44 = 2%.  Collision: 4/44 = 9%.  Scrapped: 39/44 = 89%.  Natural causes: 39/44 = 
89%.  Unnatural causes: 5/44 = 11%. 
 
Whaleback Barges:  Average tons built: 810.  Average final tonnage: 810.  Average Lifespan: 18 
years.  Burn: 1/25 = 4%.  Sank: 10/25 = 40%.  Wreck: 4/25 = 16%.  Collision: 3/12 = 12%.  
Scrapped: 6/25 = 24%.  Other: 1/25 = 4%.  Natural causes: 6/24 = 25%.  Other: 1/25 = 4%.  
Unnatural causes:18/24 = 75%. 
 
Wood, excluding loss by burning (includes composites):  Total years: 25.  Sank: 43/180 = 24%.  













































































































































                 
R. J. Hackett Wood 748 1129 208 1869 1905 36 X      No No Coal gas explosion 
William T 
Graves 
Wood 804 1075 207 1867 1885 18   X    No No Stranded, presumably in 
storm 
Raleigh Wood 980 1206 227 1871 1911 40   X    No No Stranded 1911. 
Fred Kelley Wood 926 770 212 1871 1910 39     X  Yes No Engines fitted 1873.  
Abandoned 1910. 
Joseph S. Fay Wood 882 1220 215 1871 1905 34   X    No No Stranded. 
W.L. Wetmore Wood 850 819 215 1871 1901 30   X    No No Stranded, Georgian Bay. 
H. B. Tuttle Wood 580 744 179 1871 1906 35   X    No No 
Mary Jarecki Wood 502 645 179 1871 1883 12   X    No No Wrecked, Point Au 
Sable 
Forest City Wood 743 1236 216 1870 1904 34   X    No No Wrecked, Georgian Bay 
Sarah E. 
Sheldon 
Wood 640 907 184 1872 1905 33   X    No No Beached, total loss 
Persian Wood 1429 1429 243 1873 1875 2 X      No No Burned and Sank 
Ohio Wood 1101 1101 203 1873 1894 21    X   No No Collision, sank 
Inter Ocean Wood 1068 1068 213 1872 1905 33     X  Yes No Abandoned 
Egyptian Wood 1065 1430 228 1873 1897 24 X      No No Burned and Sank 
Chauncy 
Hurlbut 




















































































































































Wood 1207 1207 212 1873 1886 13     X   No No Collision, Sank. 
David W. Rust Wood 884 884 201 1873 1905 32 X      No No Burned, reduced to 
barge, scrapped 1911. 
Cormorant Wood 872 977 218 1873 1907 34 X      No No Burned, Apostle Islands. 
Oscar 
Townsend 
Wood 817 1038 192 1873 1891 18 X      No No Burned, Port Sanilac 
D. M. Wilson Wood 757 757 179 1873 1894 21  X     No No Sank, Thunder Bay, MI. 
Geneva Wood 730 730 191 1873 1873 1  X     No No Shaft coupling failure, 
sank. 
Vienna Wood 745 1006 191 1872 1892 20    X   No No Collision, sank 
Tecumseh Wood 633 840 200 1873 1909 26 X      No No Burned, Goderich, Ont. 
Superior Wood 586 855 187 1873 1898 25   X    No No Beached, Gull Island. 








Wood 1323 1323 223 1874 1895 21   X    No No Wrecked, near 
Marquette, MI. 
E. B. Hale Wood 1186 1186 217 1874 1897 23  X     No No Sank, Pointe aux 
Barques, Lake Huron 
Havanna Wood 1041 1041 205 1874 1910 36     X  Yes No Abandoned, Erie, PA. 




Wood 980 781 205 1874 1904 30 X      No No Burned, Sank, Port 
Sanilac, MI. 











































































































































Wood 649 778 191 1874 1917 43     X  Yes No Abandoned, Ashland, 
WI. 
Alcona Wood 723 952 185 1878 1913 35 X      No No To lower St Lawrence, 
1911; burned 1913. 
Jno. N. 
Glidden 
Wood 1322 1322 221 1879 1903 24     X   No No Collision, sank 
William 
Edwards 




Wood 1775 1775 256 1880 1898 18   X    No No Wrecked, Isle Royal 
Wocoken Wood 1400 1400 251 1880 1893 13  X     No No Sank off Long Point, 
Lake Erie. 
Hiawatha Wood 1398 1398 234 1880 1921 41     X  Yes No Dismantled 1921 
Smith Moore Wood 1191 1191 223 1880 1889 9    X   No No Collision, sank 
Minnesota Wood 1138 1138 206 1880 1903 13 X      No No Burned, St Clair River 




Wood 1096 1096 205 1880 1909 29 X      No No Burned at dock, Torch 
Lake, MI. 
A. Everett Wood 1088 1088 211 1880 1895 15  X     No No Holed by ice, sank, 
Pointe aux Barques. 
Iron age Wood 859 1114 226 1880 1909 29 X      No No Burned, Detroit River 
Light. 
City of Rome Wood 1908 1908 268 1881 1914 33 X      No No Burned, vicinity of 
Dunkirk, NY. 
Tacoma Wood 1879 1879 260 1881 1914 33 X      No No Burned, Ludington, MI 
John B. Lyon Wood 1710 1710 255 1881 1900 19   X    No No Beached, broke in two, 
vicinity Erie, PA. 










































































































































Progress Wood 1596 1596 255 1880 1905 25  X     No No Sank Milwaukee 1905.  
Later raised as barge. 
Oceanica Wood 1490 1490 262 1881 1919 38 X      No No Burned, Montreal. 
Rufus P. 
Ranney 
Wood 1392 1392 247 1881 1911 30  X     No No Sank 1911, Manitowoc, 
WI.  Raised, rebuilt 
1917. 
Columbia Wood 1374 1374 235 1881 1921 40     X  Yes No Reduced to barge and 
abandoned 1921. 
Republic Wood 1343 1343 235 1881 1903 22  X     No No Sank, Ashland, WI. 




Wood 1200 756 212 1881 1923 42     X  Yes No Scuttled 1923. 
H. C. Ackley Wood 1187 1187 231 1881 1883 2  X     No No Sank off Saugatuck, MI 
Escanaba Wood 1160 1160 202 1881 1901 20  X     No No Sank off Au Sable, MI. 
Iron Duke Wood 1152 1152 212 1881 1920 39   X    No No Wrecked, St David, QU. 
Brunswick Iron 1120 1120 236 1881 1881 1    X   No No Collision, sank. 
Business Wood 985 985 191 1881 1910 29     X  Yes No Abandoned, Erie, PA. 
Robert A. 
Packer 
Wood 921 921 209 1881 1907 26 X      No No Burned off Coppermine 
Point, Lake Superior. 
Kate Butteroni Wood 865 865 174 1881 1909 28   X    No No Wrecked, South Fox 
Island, Lake Michigan. 
Queen of the 
West 
Wood 818 818 215 1881 1903 22  X     No No Sank vicinity Fairport, 
OH. 




Wood 548 753 164 1881 1902 21  X     No No Sank off Port Burwell, 
Ont. 










































































































































Wallula Wood 1924 1924 260 1882 1920 38     X  Yes No Sold off Lakes 1913.  
Scrapped 1920, ME. 
Siberia Wood 1618 1618 272 1882 1905 23   X    No No Beached vicinity Long 
Point, Lake Erie. 
Colonial Wood 1501 1501 244 1882 1914 32  X     No No Beached to prevent 
sinking, Rideau, Ont. 
Continental Wood 1506 1506 244 1882 1904 22   X    No No Wrecked, Two Rivers 
Point, Lake Michigan. 
Massachusetts Wood 1415 1530 235 1882 1923 41   X    No No Wrecked, Lake St. 
Louis, St Lawrence 
River. 




Wood 1189 1189 209 1882 1902 20  X     No No Sank, vicinity of Two 
Harbors, Minn. 




Wood 1142 1183 225 1882 1923 41   X    No No Stranded, broke in two, 
vicinity of Portneuf, 
Que. 
Hecla Wood 1110 1167 224 1882 1930 48     X  Yes No Scrapped, 1930. 
M. M. Drake Wood 1102 1102 201 1882 1901 19    X   No No Collision, Sank. 
D. C. Whitney Wood 1090 1440 229 1882 1913 31   X    No No Beached 1913.  Used as 
dry-dock until 1920. 
John M. 
Osborn 
Wood 646 891 178 1882 1884 2    X   No No Collision, sank. 
George T 
Hope. 




Wood 968 968 209 1883 1902 19 X      No No Burned, St Clair River 










































































































































Edward Smith Wood 700 700 194 1883 1930 47 X      No No Burned, Boyne City, MI. 
Australasia Wood 1829 1829 282 1884 1896 12 X      No No Burned, vicinity Cana 
Island, Lake Michigan. 
Kasota Wood 1660 1660 246 1884 1903 19  X     No No Sank 1890, raised. Sank 
1903, Grand Marais. 
City of 
Cleveland 
Wood 1528 1609 255 1882 1901 19   X    No No Wrecked, Georgian Bay. 
William 
Chisholm 
Iron 1581 1581 246 1884 1916 32   X    No No Sold off Lakes 1907.  
Wrecked 1916. 




Wood 1412 1412 230 1884 1905 21   X    No No Wrecked, vicinity of 
Duluth. 





Wood 1294 1294 240 1884 1893 9 X      No No 
Monteagle Wood 1273 1273 213 1884 1909 25   X    No No Sank, raised, burned, in 
quick succession. 
J. H. Devereux Iron 1618 1618 243 1885 1947 62     X  Yes No Sold off Lakes 1907, 
returned 1923.  Scrapped 
1947. 
New Orleans Wood 1457 1457 231 1885 1906 21    X   No No Collision, sank. 
A Folsom Wood 672 449 180 1885 1910 25   X    No No Stranded, burned, 
vicinity of Escanaba. 
W. B. Hall Wood 608 1113 158 1885 1900 5   X    No No Wrecked, Blanchard 
Island, Lake Superior. 
Charlemagne 
Tower Jr. 
Wood 1825 1825 255 1886 1914 18  X     No No Sold off Lakes 1913. 










































































































































Spokane Steel 1742 2357 249 1886 1930 44     X  Yes No Stranded 1907. 
Salvaged.  Laid up 1930, 
scrapped 1935. 
John F. Eddy  Wood 1678 1678 259 1886 1914 28     X  Yes No Reduced to barge 1914, 
sank 1920. 





Wood 1546 1546 232 1886 1894 8   X    No No Wrecked, Keweenaw 
Point. 
Manhattan Wood 1545 1545 252 1886 1903 17   X    No No Stranded and burned, 




Wood 1304 1304 224 1886 1905 21   X    No No Stranded and burned, 
Little Sable Point, Lake 
Huron. 
Veronica Wood 1093 1124 202 1886 1919 33   X    No No Stranded off Port 
Weller, Ont. 
Josephine Wood 474 775 165 1886 1906 20    X   No No Sold off Lakes 1899.  
Sank, collision, Mobile, 
AL. 
Aurora Wood 2282 2236 290 1887 1898 11   X    No No 
Thomas 
Davidson 
Wood 2226 2226 285 1888 1933 45     X  No No Abandoned 1933. 
William H. 
Wolf 




Wood 1996 2147 272 1887 1906 19     X  Yes No Reduced to barge 1906, 
Abandoned 1914. 
Yakima Wood 1986 1986 279 1887 1905 18 X      No No Burned and grounded, St 
Clair River. 










































































































































Missoula Wood 1927 1927 272 1887 1895 8  X     No No Sank vicinity Caribou 
Island, Lake Superior. 
Bulgaria Wood 1889 1889 280 1887 1915 28   X    Yes No Stranded 1906, salvaged.  
Abandoned 1915. 
Cambria Steel 1878 1878 280 1887 1924 37  X     No No Sank off Sturgeon Point, 
Lake Michigan. 
Roumania Wood 1837 1837 273 1887 1929 42     X  Yes No Abandoned 1929. 
J. C. Gilchrist Wood 1827 1827 252 1887 1907 20     X  No No Laid up after 1907.  
Final disposition 
unclear. 
Louisiana Wood 1753 1753 267 1887 1913 26   X    No No 
Ira H. Owen Steel 1753 1753 262 1887 1905 18  X     No No Sank, vicinity Caribou 
Island, Lake Superior. 
Fayette Brown Wood 
- C 
1743 2081 252 1887 1928 41     X  Yes No Scrapped 1928. 
E. M. Peck Wood 
- C 
1809 1651 252 1888 1934 46     X  Yes No Boiler exploded 1913, 
repaired; sold for scrap 
1934 




Wood 1732 1732 257 1887 1910 23 X      No No Burned, vicinity 
Ludington, MI. 








Wood 1688 1688 265 1887 1926 39     X  Yes No Abandoned Ecorse, MI. 
F. W. Wheeler Wood 1688 1688 265 1887 1893 6   X    No No Stranded, vicinity 
Michigan City, IN. 










































































































































Wiley M. Egan Wood 1677 1620 252 1887 1915 28     X  Yes No Reduced to barge 1915; 
later sunk for dock. 
R. P. 
Fitzgerald 
Wood 1682 1682 256 1887 1931 44     X  Yes No Abandoned 1931. 
Roswell P. 
Flower 




Wood 1585 1585 250 1887 1898 11   X    No No Wrecked, vicinity 
Michigan City, IN. 
Samuel 
Mather 




Wood 1576 1599 246 1887 1921 34  X     No No Sank Welland Canal. 
Gettysburg Wood 1358 1358 208 1887 1919 33  X     No No Sold off Lakes 1916.  
Sank 1919, Tybee Light, 
GA. 
Omaha Wood 1231 1251 215 1887 1925 38     X  Yes No Scuttled 1925. 
Chenango Wood 938 938 175 1887 1890 3 X      No No Burned and scuttled 
1890.  Rebuilt.  Burned 
1907. 
Corona Steel 2408 2517 299 1888 1940 52     X  Yes No 




Wood 2207 2207 286 1888 1915 27 X      No No Burned, Portage 
Waterway, Lake 
Superior. 
Gladstone Wood 2112 2112 283 1888 1923 35     X  Yes No Abandoned 1923 
Helena Wood 2083 2083 275 1888 1918 30   X    No No Stranded, total loss. 
George G. 
Hadley 
Wood 2073 2073 287 1888 1902 14    X   No No Collision, sank 1902.  










































































































































John Craig Wood 2044 2044 275 1888 1906 18   X    No No Stranded 1903, salvaged.  
Wrecked 1906. 
Phillip Minch Wood 1988 1988 275 1888 1904 16 X      No No Burned and sank vicinity 
of Mddle Island, Lake 
Erie. 
Neosho Wood 1982 1982 266 1888 1894 6   X    No No Wrecked Spectacle Reef, 
Lake Huron.  Later 
Salvaged. 




Wood 1927 1927 272 1888 1908 20 X      No No Burned and sank vicinity 




Wood 1846 2167 277 1888 1918 30   X    No No Wrecked vicinity of 
Grand Marais, MI. 
George W. 
Roby 
Wood 1843 1843 281 1888 1906 18   X    No No Grounded, burned, sank; 
abandoned 1906. 




Wood 1810 1810 281 1888 1914 26 X      No No Burned, Marine City, 
MI. 
Algonquin Steel 1806 1805 245 1888 1917 29      X War No Sold off Lakes 1916.  
Torpedoed 1917. 
Robert Mills Wood 1790 1790 256 1888 1929 41     X  Yes No Abandoned 1929. 
Mecosta Wood 1776 1776 281 1888 1922 34  X     No No Sank off Rocky River, 
OH. 
Specular Wood 1741 1741 263 1882 1900 8    X   No No Fitted with engines 

















































































































































Wood 1739 1739 256 1888 1905 17 X      No No Burned and sank, 




Wood 1713 1713 260 1888 1902 14    X   No No Collision, sank, Nine 
Mile Point, Lake 
Michigan. 
Servia Wood 1425 1425 242 1888 1898 10 X      No No Burned and Sank, 
vicinity of Whitefish 
Point. 
Susan E. Peck Wood 
- C 
1399 1808 230 1886 1933 47     X  Yes No Fitted with Engines 
1888.  Scrapped 1933. 
George H. 
Dyer 
Wood 1372 1372 208 1888 1926 38     X  Yes No Abandoned 1926. 
John Rugee Wood 1216 1216 216 1888 1925 37 X      No No Burned at Ogdensburg. 
Germanic Wood 1131 1131 216 1888 1909 21 X      No No Burned, Georgian Bay. 




Wood 1044 1044 192 1888 1897 9 X      No No Burned off Evanston, IL. 
Britannic Wood 1021 1319 219 1888 1926 38 X      No No Burned Kingston. 
Castalia Steel 2512 3125 292 1889 1919 30  X     No No To ocean 1917, broke in 
half, sank. 
Pontiac Steel 2298 2298 300 1889 1917 28   X    No No Wrecked near Lyal 
Island, Lake Huron. 
James C. 
Lockwood 
Wood 2278 2278 286 1889 1917 28  X     No No Sprang a leak; caught 
fire while being 
abandoned. 
Neshoto Wood 2255 2255 284 1889 1908 19   X    No No Wrecked Crisp Point, 
Lake Superior. 













































































































































2132 1778 281 1889 1956 67     X  Yes No Laid up 1956, Scrapped 
1960. 
John Owen Wood 
- C 
2127 2127 281 1889 1919 30  X     No No Sank, vicinity Caribou 





2134 2134 281 1889 1905 16    X   No No Collision, sank. 
Charles A. 
Eddy 
Wood 2075 2075 281 1889 1918 29     X  Yes No Dismantled 1918. 
Olympia Wood 2065 2065 276 1889 1918 29     X  Yes No Broken up 1918. 
C. W. Elphicke Wood 2058 2058 273 1889 1913 24  X     No No Beached to prevent 
sinking, broke in two. 
Italia Wood 2036 2305 289 1889 1915 26     X  Yes No Cut down to barge 1915, 
broken up 1920. 




Wood 1991 1991 264 1889 1915 26     X  Yes No Reduced to barge, sank 
same year. 




Wood 1936 1936 265 1889 1905 16   X    No No Wrecked and burned, 
Green Bay. 
Nyanza Wood 1888 1888 280 1890 1919 29  X     No No Sank, 1919. 
George F. 
Williams 
Wood 1888 1888 280 1890 1913 23     X  Yes No Abandoned 1913 
John Mitchell Wood 1864 2149 283 1889 1923 34 X      No No Burned 1923. 
Griffin Steel 1856 1445 266 1891 1970 79     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1970. 
Joliet Steel 1921 1921 266 1890 1911 21    X   No No Collision, sank 1911. 









































































































































Wawatam Steel 1856 1880 266 1890 1937 47     X  Yes No Scrapped 1937. 
Fedora Wood 1848 1848 282 1889 1901 12 X      No No Burned, beached. 
John 
Plankington 
Wood 1821 1821 267 1889 1917 28    X   No No Collision, sank. 
Passadena Wood 1760 1982 250 1889 1906 17   X    No No Wrecked, Keweenaw 
Waterway. 
Vulcan Steel 1759 1799 260 1889 1944 55     X  Yes No Scrapped 1944. 
Parks Foster Steel 1729 1774 262 1889 1960 71     X  Yes No Scrapped 1960. 
Topeka Wood 1376 1376 228 1889 1916 27    X   No No Collision, sank, Detroit 
River. 
Cherokee Wood 1304 1057 208 1889 1920 31  X     No No Sank, Welland Canal.  
Later raised and rebuilt. 
Marion Wood 1206 930 217 1889 1926 37 X      No No Burned and sank. 
Oscar T. Flint Wood 824 1126 218 1889 1909 20 X      No No Burned and sank, 
vicinity Thunder Bay. 
MI. 
Fred Pabst Wood 2143 2143 287 1890 1907 17    X   No No Collision, sank, St Clair 
River.  Later raised as 
barge.  
Maryland Steel 2419 2419 316 1890 1916 26  X     No No Sold off Lakes, sank 
1916. 
W. H. Gilcher Steel 2415 2415 301 1890 1892 2  X     No No Sank Lake Michigan. 
Emily P. Weed Steel 2363 3168 300 1890 1905 15   X    No No Wrecked, Lake Superior. 
Western 
Reserve 
Steel 2392 2392 300 1890 1892 2  X     No No Sank, vicinity Whitefish 
Point. 
Briton Steel 2348 2348 296 1890 1929 39   X    No No Sold off Lakes 1917, 
returned 1923.  Wrecked 
1929. 
Germanic Steel 2348 2348 296 1890 1919 29    X   No No Sold off Lakes 1918.  









































































































































Grecian Steel 2348 2348 296 1890 1906 16   X    No No Grounded.  
Subsequently sunk under 
tow to shipyard. 
Norman Steel 2304 2304 296 1890 1895 5    X   No No Collision, sank. 
Roman Steel 2348 2348 296 1890 1919 29  X     No No 
Saxon Steel 2348 2348 296 1890 1927 37     X  Yes No Sold off Lakes 1918.  
Scrapped 1927. 
S. R. Kirby Steel 2339 2339 294 1890 1916 26  X     No No Sank vicinity Eagle 
Harbor, MI. 
Manola Steel 2326 2326 282 1890 1924 34   X    No No Wrecked 1924, Georgian 
Bay. 
Mariska Steel 2326 3072 283 1890 1959 69     X  Yes No 
Maruba Steel 2311 2311 290 1890 1934 44     X  Yes No Sold off Lakes 1917; 
returned 1925.  Scrapped 
1934. 
Matoa Steel 2311 2723 290 1890 1937 47     X  Yes No Wrecked 1913, 
salvaged.  Scrapped 
1937. 




Wood 2139 2139 285 1890 1902 12  X     No No Sank vicinity Fairport, 
OH. 
C. F. Bielman Wood 2056 2056 291 1892 1926 34     X  Yes No Barge 1917-1918.  Laid 
up 1926 and abandoned. 
L. R. Doty Wood 2056 2056 291 1893 1898 5  X     No No Sank vicinity 
Milwaukee. 




Wood 2053 2053 291 1891 1903 12  X     No No Sank, vicinity Whitefish 
Point. 









































































































































Uganda Wood 2054 2054 291 1892 1913 21  X     No No Sank, Lake Michigan. 
John Harper Wood 1952 1952 298 1890 1914 24  X     No No Sank, Detroit River. 




Steel 1962 1962 246 1890 1944 54     X  Yes No Scrapped 1944. 
R. E. Schuck Wood 1868 1868 265 1890 1913 23   X    No No Grounded and burned, 
Green Bay. 
J. H. Wade Steel 1863 2301 265 1890 1926 36     X  Yes No Sold off Lakes 1918.  
Scrapped 1926. 
Hesper Wood 1859 1859 250 1890 1905 15   X    No No Wrecked, Beaver Bay, 
Lake Superior. 
John Oades Wood 1455 1455 212 1890 1925 35     X  Yes No Reduced to barge 1925.  
Later abandoned. 
St Lawrence Wood 1437 1437 239 1890 1898 8   X    No No Wrecked vicinity Point 
Betsie, Lake Michigan. 
Hiram W. 
Sibley 
Wood 1419 1419 221 1890 1898 8   X    No No Grounded, broke up. 
Byron 
Whitaker 
Wood 1405 1538 220 1890 1920 30 X      No No Burned 1920. 
Panther Wood 1373 1634 237 1890 1916 26    X   No No Collision, sank, 
Whitefish Bay. 
Denver Wood 1295 1103 222 1890 1937 47     X  Yes No Last listed 1937.  
Presumed abandoned. 
Ionia Wood 1287 1367 209 1890 1925 35     X  Yes No Scuttled 1925. 
Colgate Hoyt Steel 1253 1253 276 1890 1909 19   X    No Yes Off Lakes 1906.  
Wrecked 1909, NJ. 
Joseph L. 
Colby 
Steel 1245 1245 265 1890 1935 45     X  Yes Yes Periodically off Lakes. 
Scrapped 1935. 












































































































































Wood 2608 2608 305 1891 1919 28  X     No No Sank, vicinity Passage 
Island, Lake Superior. 
Marina Steel 2432 2410 292 1891 1917 26   X    No No Wrecked 1917. 
Masaba Steel 2432 1913 292 1891 1924 33     X  Yes No Off Lakes 1918.  
Presumed scrapped 
1924. 
City of Berlin Wood 2051 2051 298 1891 1925 34   X    No No Grounded, subsequently 
abandoned. 








Wood 2006 2006 297 1891 1913 22    X   No No Collision, sank. 
City of Naples Wood 2109 2109 301 1892 1919 27 X      No No Burned and sank. 
City of Paris Wood 2063 2063 298 1891 1929 38     X  Yes No Reduced to barge. 
City of Venice Wood 2108 2108 301 1892 1902 10    X   No No Collision, sank. 
E. B. Bartlett Steel 1400 1400 265 1891 1916 25  X     No Yes Off Lakes 1905, sank 
1916, Cape Cod Canal. 
A. D. 
Thompson 
Steel 1400 1400 265 1891 1936 45     X  Yes Yes Off Lakes 1905-1922.  
Scrapped 1936. 
Pueblo Wood 1349 1493 225 1891 1926 35 X      No No Burned and scuttled. 
John Duncan Wood 1268 1517 225 1891 1919 28    X   No No Damaged in collision, 
abandoned. 
Mariposa Steel 2831 2831 330 1892 1944 52     X  Yes No Laid up 1944, 
subsequently scrapped. 
Maritana Steel 2957 2957 330 1892 1947 55     X  Yes No Scrapped 1947. 
Selwyn Eddy Steel 2846 2846 343 1892 1945 53     X  Yes No Straightback.  Off Lakes 
1916. 















































































































































Steel 2278 2379 292 1892 1974 82     X  Yes No Reduced to barge 1974.  
Scrapped 1994. 




Steel 1713 1713 308 1892 1916 24  X     No Yes Sank, Lake Erie. 
Samuel 
Mather 
Steel 1713 1713 308 1892 1924 32  X     No Yes Sank, Lake Huron. 
Iroquois Wood 1699 1769 242 1892 1930 38     X  Yes No Dismantled 1930. 
Andaste Steel 1574 1574 266 1892 1929 38  X     No No Straightback.  Sank, 
Lake Michigan. 
Choctaw Steel 1574 1574 266 1892 1916 24    X   No No Straightback.  Sank, 
Lake Huron. 
Cadillac Steel 1264 1297 230 1892 1922 30   X    No No Wrecked, Keweenaw 
Waterway. 
Pioneer Steel 1124 1079 226 1892 1917 25    X   No No 
John J. Hill Wood 974 974 170 1892 1903 11  X     No No Off Lakes 1901.  
Abandoned at sea 1903. 
Centurion Steel 3402 3402 360 1893 1945 53     X  Yes No Laid up 1945, scrapped 
1947. 
S. S. Curry Steel 3260 3931 360 1893 1937 44     X  Yes No Scrapped 1937. 
Merida Steel 3261 3329 360 1893 1916 23  X     No No Sank, Long Point. 
Thomas 
Cranage 
Wood 2220 2220 305 1893 1911 18   X    No No Wrecked, Georgian Bay. 
Yuma Steel 2195 2195 322 1893 1933 40     X  Yes No Straightback.  Off Lakes 
1918.  Barge 1933.  
Sank 1949. 










































































































































George Stone Wood 1841 1841 270 1893 1909 16   X    No No Stranded and burned, 
Pelee Passage. 




Steel 2674 2674 351 1894 1927 33     X  Yes No Off Lakes 1916.  
Scrapped 1927. 
I. W. Nicholas Steel 2624 1889 328 1894 1937 43     X  Yes No Off Lakes 1916 - 1922.  
Scrapped 1937. 
Shenandoah Wood 2252 2252 308 1894 1924 30     X  Yes No Abandoned, Bay City. 
Madagascar Wood 1203 1203 241 1894 1909 15  X     No No Off lakes 1907.  Sank 
1909. 
Nicaragua Wood 1202 1202 241 1894 1921 27     X  Yes No Laid up 1921, scrapped. 
Victory Steel 3775 4527 387 1895 1969 74     X  Yes No Sunk for breakwater 
1969 
Zenith City Steel 3850 3850 387 1895 1947 52     X  Yes No Scrapped 1947. 
W. D. Rees Steel 3760 3760 387 1895 1956 61     X  Yes No Scrapped 1956. 
Penobscot Steel 3503 4077 351 1895 1955 60     X  Yes No Used for storage after 
1955.  Scrapped 1963. 




Steel 3400 3400 352 1895 1928 33   X    No No Wrecked, Cana Island, 
Lake Michigan. 
Chili Steel 2584 2656 320 1895 1943 48   X    No No Wrecked Point Isabel, 
Lake Superior. 
Rappahannock Wood 2381 2381 308 1895 1911 16   X    No No Wrecked, Jackfish Bay, 
Lake Superior. 
Sacramento Wood 2381 2381 308 1895 1939 44     X  Yes No Abandoned, Bay City. 
Scottish Hero Steel 2202 2202 297 1895 1917 22      X War No Turret.  To Lakes 1907-










































































































































Turret Cape Steel 1827 2079 253 1895 1959 64     X  Yes No Turret.  On Lakes 1904-
1941; 1950-59.  
Scrapped 1959. 
Turret Chief Steel 1881 1881 253 1896 1928 32     X  Yes No 
Turret Court Steel 1849 1849 253 1896 1931 35     X  Yes No 








Wood 978 978 182 1895 1906 11   X    No No Off Lakes 1900.  








Steel 4321 4321 413 1896 1943 47     X  Yes No To storage barge 1943.  
Scrapped 1971. 




Steel 4344 4344 413 1896 1944 48    X   No No Collision, sank 1944. 
L. C. Waldo Steel 4244 4422 387 1896 1967 71     X  Yes No Scrapped 1967. 
Maricopa Steel 4224 4281 406 1896 1974 78     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1974. 
Sir William 
Fairbairn 
Steel 4220 4220 424 1896 1962 66     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1962.   
Robert Fulton Steel 4220 4220 424 1896 1946 50     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1946. 
James Watt Steel 4090 4090 405 1896 1961 65     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1961. 
Senator Steel 4049 4049 410 1896 1929 33    X   No No Collision, sank, vicinity 
Port Washington. 
Queen City Steel 3980 3980 401 1896 1947 51     X  Yes No Scrapped 1947. 









































































































































City of Bangor Steel 3691 4202 372 1896 1926 30   X    No No Wrecked Keweenaw 
Point. 
E. W. Oglebay Steel 3666 3666 375 1896 1927 31   X    No No Wrecked vicinity 
Marquette, MI. 




Steel 2760 3383 366 1896 1972 76     X  Yes Yes Out of service 1972; 
museum. 
Appomatox Wood 2644 2644 319 1896 1905 9   X    No No Wrecked vicinity 
Milwaukee. 
Rosemount Steel 1580 1580 245 1896 1931 35     X  Yes No Out of service 1931.  
Scrapped 1939. 
Crescent City Steel 4213 4213 406 1897 1955 58     X  Yes No To grain storage 1955.  
Scrapped 1959. 
Empire City Steel 4118 4716 405 1897 1968 71     X  Yes No Scrapped 1968. 
Andrew 
Carnegie 
Steel 4100 4100 403 1897 1947 50     X  Yes No Scrapped 1947. 
Venezuela Wood 2125 2125 263 1897 1922 25     X  Yes No To barge 1922. 
Abandoned 1929. 
Niagara Steel 1951 1760 266 1897 1982 85     X  Yes No Out of service 1982. 
Black Rock Wood 1646 1646 237 1897 1925 28     X  Yes No Off Lakes 1912.  
Abandoned 1925. 
Bermuda Wood 1312 1246 220 1897 1924 27 X      No No Burned, Lake Ontario. 
Douglass 
Houghton 
Steel 5332 5107 456 1899 1969 70     X  Yes No Sunk for breakwater 
1969 
Samuel F. B. 
Morse 
Steel 4936 4557 456 1898 1954 56     X  Yes No To barge 1954. 
Superior City Steel 4795 4795 429 1898 1920 22    X   No No Collision, sank, 
Whitefish Bay. 












































































































































Steel 4521 4521 413 1898 1947 49     X  Yes No Scrapped 1947. 
Hendrick S. 
Holden 




Steel 4328 4068 400 1898 1964 66     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1964. 
Alexander 
McDougall 
Steel 3686 3686 413 1898 1947 49     X  Yes Yes Scrapped 1947. 
Amazonas Wood 2228 2228 295 1898 1930 32     X  Yes No Abandoned 1930. 
Orinoco Wood 2226 2226 295 1898 1924 26  X     No No Sank, Lake Superior. 
Cornell Steel 5082 5082 454 1900 1961 61     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1961. 
Harvard Steel 5054 5054 461 1900 1960 60     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1960. 
Lafayette Steel 5113 5113 454 1899 1905 6   X    No No Wrecked, vicinity Two 
Harbors, MN. 
Princeton Steel 5125 5125 454 1900 1953 53     X  Yes No To barge 1953. 
Rensselaer Steel 5124 5124 454 1900 1947 47     X  Yes No Scrapped 1947. 
Texas Steel 5229 5229 454 1899 1963 64     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1963. 
Henry W. 
Oliver 
Steel 4909 4959 444 1899 1967 68     X  Yes No Scrapped 1967. 
Pennsylvania Steel 4840 4840 429 1899 1964 65     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1964. 
Tennessee Steel 4951 4951 430 1899 1971 72     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1971. 




Steel 4748 4611 416 1899 1967 68     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1967. 
M. A. Hanna Steel 4661 4599 410 1899 1967 68     X  Yes No Sold for scrap 1967. 










































































































































Angeline Steel 4644 4644 423 1899 1958 59     X  Yes No Grain storage 1958.  
Scrapped 1965. 
Aurania Steel 3113 3218 352 1895 1909 14  X     No No Engines fitted 1899.  
Sank 1909, Whitefish 
Bay. 
Eureka Steel 2122 2122 237 1899 1937 38     X  Yes No Off Lakes 1904.  
Scrapped 1937. 
Tampico Steel 2133 2133 247 1900 1963 63     X  Yes No Off Lakes 1904-20, '42-
43.  Barge 1963. 
India Wood 
- C 
976 976 215 1899 1928 29 X      No No Burned, Georgian Bay. 
William 
Edenborn 




Steel 5904 5904 478 1900 1961 61     X  Yes No Scrapped 1961. 
John W. Gates Steel 5946 5946 478 1900 1961 61     X  Yes No Scrapped 1961. 





Steel 5619 5619 470 1900 1954 54     X  Yes No Reduced to barge 1954, 
scrapped 1956. 
Robert W. E. 
Bunsen 
Steel 5181 5181 439 1900 1954 54     X  Yes No Converted to barge 








Steel 4719 4719 420 1900 1946 46     X  Yes No Scrapped 1946 
Simon J. 
Murphy 












































































































































Steel 4901 4901 435 1900 1969 69     X  Yes No Sunk as breakwater. 
Asuncion Steel 2196 2196 242 1900 1924 24     X  Yes No Scrapped 1924. 




Steel 2293 2293 242 1900 1936 36   X    No No Wrecked 1936, Fairport, 
OH. 
A. B. Wolvin Steel 2286 2286 242 1900 1916 16  X     No No Off Lakes 1911.  
Presumed sunk 1916. 
Ravenscraig Steel 2280 2280 243 1900 1923 23     X  Yes No Presumed scrapped 
1923. 
Donnacona Steel 1906 1906 245 1900 1915 15  X     No No Off Lakes 1915; sank 
same year. 
Strathcona Steel 1881 1881 249 1900 1917 17      X War No Off Lakes 1915.  Sunk 
enemy action 1917. 
Alfred 
Mitchell 
Wood 1751 1751 255 1900 1921 21     X  Yes No Off Lakes 1917.  
Presumed scrapped 
1921. 
Cartagena Wood 1532 1532 241 1900 1907 7   X    No No Off Lakes 1907; 
wrecked same year. 
Georgetown Steel 1358 1358 243 1900 1917 17  X     No No Off Lakes 1916.  Sank 
1917. 
Waccamaw Steel 1359 1471 249 1900 1931 31     X  Yes No Laid up 1931. 
Neptune Steel 3717 3493 346 1900 1966 66     X  Yes No Laid up 1966. 
Australia Steel 3745 3845 376 1898 1948 50     X  Yes No Engines fitted 1902.  
Scrapped 1948. 
Amazon Steel 3702 3702 376 1897 1954 57     X  Yes No Engines fitted 1908.  
Scrapped 1954. 
W. H. Gilbert Steel 2820 2820 328 1892 1914 22    X   No No Collision sank. 











































































































































Steel 1399 1399 265 1891 1892 1   X    No Yes Off Lakes 1891, 




Steel 1713 1713 308 1892 1902 10    X   No Yes Collision, sank. 
Washburn Steel 2234 2234 320 1892 1936 44     X  Yes Yes Scrapped, 1936. 
Pillsbury Steel 2234 2234 320 1892 1934 42   X    No Yes Stranded, total loss. 
Barge 101 Steel 428 428 178 1888 1908 20  X     No Yes Sank, Maine coast. 
Barge 102 Steel 1192 1192 253 1889 1905 16  X     No Yes Foundered Cape 
Charles, VA. 
Barge 103 Steel 1192 1192 253 1889 1909 20  X     No Yes Foundered, Sandy Hook, 
NJ. 
Barge 104 Steel 1295 1295 276 1890 1908 18  X     No Yes Foundered, vicinity 
Cleveland, OH. 
Barge 105 Steel 1295 1295 276 1890 1910 20  X     No Yes Foundered, vicinity Fire 
Island Lightship, NY. 
Barge 107 Steel 1295 1295 276 1890 1913 23  X     No Yes Sank Nantucket Shoals, 
1913. 
Barge 109 Steel 1227 1227 265 1891 1914 23  X     No Yes Foundered Montauk 
Point, NY. 
Barge 110 Steel 1296 1296 265 1891 1932 41 X      No Yes Explosion, burned at 
dock, sank, St Rose, LA. 
Barge 111 Steel 1227 1227 265 1891 1916 25    X   No Yes Collision, sank, 
Hampton Roads, VA. 
Barge 115 Steel 1169 1169 256 1891 1899 8   X    No Yes Stranded, Pic Island, 
Lake Superior 
Barge 116 Steel 1169 1176 256 1891 1946 55     X  Yes Yes Scrapped, TX, 1946. 
Barge 117 Steel 1310 1159 285 1891 1926 35      X Unknown Yes Sold British 1926, no 
further record. 











































































































































Steel 1601 1601 308 1892 1901 9    X   No Yes Collision, sank, 
Whitefish Bay. 
Barge 126 Steel 1128 1128 264 1892 1905 13   X    No Yes Stranded, Buzzard's Bay, 
MA. 
Barge 127 Steel 1128 1148 264 1892 1936 44     X  Yes Yes Scrapped 1936, New 
Orleans, LA 
Barge 129 Steel 1310 1310 292 1893 1902 9    X   No Yes Collision, sank, 1902. 
Barge 130 Steel 1310 1310 292 1893 1924 31     X  Yes Yes Scrapped, TX, 1924. 
Barge 131 Steel 1310 1159 292 1893 1946 53     X  Yes Yes Scrapped, TX, 1946. 
Barge 132 Steel 1310 1159 292 1893 1927 34  X     No Yes Foundered, Freeport, TX 
Barge 133 Steel 1310 1159 292 1893 1911 18  X     No Yes Foundered, Fire Island, 
NY. 
Barge 134 Steel 1310 1159 292 1893 1912 19   X    No Yes Stranded, Hampton 
Roads, VA. 
Barge 137 Steel 2480 2638 345 1896 1965 69     X  Yes Yes Scrapped, 1965 
Barge 201 Steel 664 948 182 1890 1919 29   X    No Yes Stranded, Sandy Hook, 
NJ. 
Barge 202 Steel 665 948 182 1890 1908 18  X     No Yes Foundered, Barnegat, 
NJ. 
  
 
